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"No very deep knowledge of economics is usually needed for grasping the 
immediate effects of a measure; but the task of economics is to foretell the 
remoter effects, and so to allow us to avoid such acts as attempt to remedy 
a present ill by sowing the seeds of a much greater ill for the future". 
     
The Theory of Money and Credit. 
Ludwig von Mises, 1934 
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Introduction
This thesis consists of three interconnected essays on monetary policy which emphasize
the long-term perspective. The neutrality of monetary policy in the long run has been
extensively studied; however, we simultaneously consider some elements that have never
been merged in the literature in order to analyze the relationship between the cycle and
the trend. Our main contribution is the extension of knowledge about the role played
by the long-term elements included in the widely-used monetary policy rules, generally
called Taylor rules, in the determination of the long-run path. We are also interested in
the performance of the nancial variables and the e¤ects of the frictions present in credit
markets on the long-term dynamics.
Although the three chapters could be treated independently, as they are self-contained,
this dissertation has a clearly dened storyline. We rst construct the benchmark theo-
retical model, then we extend it in order to interpret the natural rate of interest and, to
conclude, we empirically evaluate the main conclusions of the two previous chapters.
The rst chapter lays the foundations of the rest of the dissertation as it develops the
workhorse model and raises some issues that will be discussed thereafter. We extend the
New Keynesian DSGE macroeconomic model by incorporating endogenous growth, non-
zero trend ination and frictions in the nancial markets. Endogenous growth is guided by
the spill-over e¤ects generated by capital accumulation, trend ination is set by the central
1
bank in the monetary policy rule and nancial frictions are included following an agency
problem as in Gertler and Karadi (2011). In this context, we study the long-lasting e¤ects
that conventional and unconventional monetary policies generate on real and nancial
variables. We show that nancial variables play a key role in the determination of the
steady-state growth rate. Moreover, the so-called nancial accelerator a¤ects the long-
term path of the real variables, given the value of the trend ination. In the calibrated
model, we nd that long-run growth rate, welfare, investment and nancial wealth are
maximized at a trend ination of 1.7% while the leverage, external nance premium
and marginal gain of the nancial intermediaries are minimized. The set of interactions
present in the long-run equilibrium are characterized by a clear non-linear behavior.
With respect to short-term dynamics, responses of real variables such as growth rate and
investment to conventional monetary policies are inuenced by the level of trend ination.
Finally, we show that, in crisis periods, unconventional monetary policies not only reduce
the e¤ects of the decline in asset valuation, but could also extend the disturbance impact
to the long-run horizon.
In the second chapter, we take the theoretical model previously developed as our basis
to analyze the problem posed by the unobservable character of the natural rate of interest
to central banks if they mismeasure it. Our denition of the natural rate of interest
indicates that nancial parameters are involved in its determination, which was implicitly
seen in the previous chapter. Furthermore, we raise the possibility of a mismatching of
the natural rate of interest and the intercept of the Taylor rule. Our main result reveals
that, if the central bank incorrectly estimates this rate, long-run growth could be a¤ected
because the trend ination would di¤er from its target and, hence, long-run equilibrium
would become dependent on both the natural rate of interest estimation and the long-run
ination target. Afterwards, we design an iterative mechanism to monitor the accuracy
2
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of the estimation of the natural rate of interest and the position of the ination target
relative to the optimal rate in order to improve the results of the monetary policy from
the growth rate perspective. To this end, the central bank would use instruments such
as the intercept of the Taylor rule and the parameter that reacts to ination deviations
from the steady-state value.
In the third chapter, we empirically test the theoretical outcomes obtained in the
previous chapters for the United States over the period 1960-2013. The semi-structural
econometric model based on our benchmark model allows us to analyze the main rela-
tionships established in the long term. Our results corroborate the non-linear relationship
between the long-run growth rate and the trend ination found in Chapter 1. Through
the estimation of a quadratic equation, we nd a hump-shaped relation between these two
variables. Nevertheless, a quantile regression which di¤erentiates among levels of trend
ination suggests that some segments of this relationship are not statistically signicant.
On the basis of the same approach, we also conrm the negative impact that nancial
frictions have on the long-run growth rate when such rigidities surpass a certain value,
which occurs for extreme levels of trend ination. For intermediate levels, such e¤ects are
not statistically signicant or even positive. Moreover, our outcomes show that mismea-
surement errors of the natural rate of interest a¤ect the trend ination deviations from
its target since monetary policy is conducted through Taylor rules which react severely
and preemptively against ination deviations, thus verifying the conclusion obtained in
Chapter 2.
To analyze these long-term relationships between unobservable variables, we have
jointly estimated the long-run growth rate, the trend ination and the natural rate of
interest by applying the Kalman lter following Laubach and Williams (2003). All these
unobservable variables are specied as time-varying and we also account for nancial
3
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frictions in the estimation procedure.
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Introducción
Esta tesis consiste en tres ensayos sobre política monetaria que enfatizan la perspectiva
del largo plazo. La neutralidad de la política monetaria en el largo plazo ha sido ampli-
amente estudiada, pero este trabajo combina elementos que nunca han sido analizados
conjuntamente en la literatura con el n de profundizar en la relación entre el ciclo y
la tendencia económica. La principal aportación de este trabajo es una ampliación del
conomiento sobre el papel que desempeñan los elementos de largo plazo incluidos en las
reglas de la política monetaria más comunes, generalmente denominadas reglas de Taylor,
en la determinación del equilibrio estacionario. Además, esta tesis también se centra en
los efectos que las fricciones presentes en los mercados nancieros pueden originar en la
dinámica de largo plazo.
Aunque los tres capítulos se pueden considerar de forma independiente, esta tesis tiene
una línea argumental claramente denida. En primer lugar se construye el modelo teórico
de referencia, a continuación se extiende con el n de interpretar el tipo de interés natural
y nalmente se evalúan empíricamente las principales conclusiones de los dos capítulos
anteriores.
El primer capítulo amplía el modelo macroeconómico DSGE neokeynesiano mediante
la incorporación de crecimiento económico endógeno, inación de equilibrio estacionario
no nula y fricciones nancieras. El crecimiento endógeno está originado por los efectos
5
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externos positivos que genera el stock total de capital, la inación de largo plazo la ja
el Banco Central mediante la regla de política monetaria y las fricciones nancieras se
introducen a través de un problema de agencia como en Gertler y Karadi (2011). En este
contexto, se estudian los efectos de largo plazo que las políticas monetarias convencionales
y no convencionales ejercen sobre las variables reales y nancieras. Se demuestra que las
variables nancieras juegan un papel clave en la determinación de la tasa de crecimiento
de equilibrio estacionario y que el acelerador nanciero afecta a la trayectoria de largo
plazo de las variables reales, dado el valor de la inación de equilibrio estacionario. En
el modelo calibrado se concluye que, en el estado estacionario, la tasa de crecimiento,
el bienestar, la inversión y la riqueza nanciera se maximizan para una inación de
equilibrio del 1,7 %, mientras que el apalancamiento, la prima de nanciación externa
y la ganancia marginal de los intermediarios nancieros alcanzan su valor mínimo. El
conjunto de interacciones existentes en el equilibrio de largo plazo se caracterizan por un
claro comportamiento no lineal. En la dinámica de corto plazo las respuestas de variables
como la tasa de crecimiento o la inversión se ven inuenciadas por el nivel de inación de
equilibrio estacionario. Por último se muestra que, en los períodos de crisis, la política
monetaria no convencional reduce los efectos negativos que actúan sobre la valoración
de los activos, pero también puede prolongar el impacto de las perturbaciones sobre la
economía mucho más que sin la implementación de dichas políticas.
El segundo capítulo se basa en el modelo teórico desarrollado en primero con el
propósito de profundizar en la problemática que genera la inobservabilidad de la tasa
natural de interés cuando los bancos centrales la estiman incorrectamente. Nuestros re-
sultados revelan que los parámetros que caracterizan la estructura del sector nanciero
desempeñan un papel clave en la determinación de la tasa natural de interés, lo cual se
advertía implícitamente en el primer capítulo. Además, planteamos la posibilidad de que
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la tasa natural de interés y la constante de la regla de Taylor puedan no coincidir. De
nuestros resultados se deduce que los errores en la estimación de la tasa natural de interés
afectan a la tasa de crecimiento de largo plazo mediante la modicación de la inación de
equilibrio estacionario, que diere, en tal situación, de la tasa objetivo jada por el banco
central. En este escenario, la tasa de crecimiento de largo plazo dependerá también de
los objetivos de inación y de la estimación de la tasa natural de interés. Finalmente
se diseña un mecanismo dirigido a supervisar la adecuación de la estimación de la tasa
natural de interés y la posición del objetivo de inación respecto a la tasa óptima desde
el punto de vista del crecimiento con el n de mejorar los resultados de la política mon-
etaria. El banco central tendría que usar como instrumentos la constante de la regla de
Taylor y el parámetro de respuesta a las desviaciones de la inación respecto a su valor
de equilibrio estacionario.
En el tercer capítulo se verica empíricamente la validez de los principales resulta-
dos teóricos para el caso de Estados Unidos durante el periodo 1960-2013. El modelo
econométrico semiestructural basado en nuestro modelo de referencia permite examinar
las relaciones entre las variables de largo plazo. Los resultados corroboran la relación
no lineal existente entre la tasa de crecimiento de largo plazo y la inación de estado
estacionario establecida en el Capítulo 1. A través de una ecuación cuadrática se prueba
que la relación resultante tiene forma de U invertida. No obstante, la estimación de una
regresión cuantílica que diferencia entre niveles de inación de estado estacionario sug-
iere que dicha relación no es signicativa o diere de los resultados anteriores para alguno
de los tramos considerados. Basándonos en las mismas técnicas se conrma el impacto
negativo que las fricciones nancieras ejercen sobre la tasa de crecimiento de largo plazo
cuando tales rigideces superan cierto valor, lo cual ocurre para niveles de inación de
estado estacionario extremos. Para niveles intermedios tales efectos son estadísticamente
7
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insignicativos e incluso positivos. Por último, nuestros resultados sugieren que los er-
rores en la estimación de la tasa natural de interés afectan a las desviaciones de la inación
de equilibrio estacionario respecto de la tasa objetivo desde que la política monetaria se
conduce a través de reglas de Taylor que reaccionan preventiva y agresivamente contra
la inación, conclusión coherente con los resultados obtenidos en el Capítulo 2.
Con el n de analizar estas conexiones de largo plazo entre variables inobservables
se estiman conjuntamente la tasa de crecimiento de largo plazo, la inación de equilib-
rio estacionario y la tasa natural de interés mediante la aplicación del ltro de Kalman
siguiendo el procedimiento de Laubach y Williams (2003). Se especican todos los com-
ponentes no observables como variables endógenas y, asimismo, se incluyen las fricciones
nancieras en la estimación.
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Chapter 1
Monetary Policy and Growth with
Trend Ination and Financial
Frictions
1.1 Introduction
The recent economic crisis, triggered in mid-2007, has highlighted the severe and long-
lasting consequences that nancial frictions have on the economies. After the outbreak of
the crisis, the power of the credit markets to provide liquidity to the economies has been
weakened, which is delaying the economic recovery in most developed countries. Since
the natural mechanisms of the credit markets are not operating exibly and, as a result,
countriesoutput is being seriously a¤ected, central banks have adopted a two-pronged
strategy. On the one hand, monetary authorities have implemented a very expansive
monetary policy through near zero nominal interest rates and, on the other, they have
provided direct lending to private markets in order to ensure the necessary liquidity to
9
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satisfy the real demand. However, neither the lax monetary policy nor the direct liquidity
injections appear to be appeasing the short-term negative e¤ects of the crisis. This fact
leads us to think that the recovery may take some time because the e¤ects of the nancial
crisis could be reaching the long-term dynamics. Hence, we need economic models of the
highest accuracy that connect the short and long term in order to provide a deeper
perspective. Further study of the key macroeconomic roles of the nancial and monetary
markets is crucial not only to explain business cycles, but also to better understand the
long-run path of the economies.
So far, the literature has not considered endogenous economic growth and trend in-
ation together in models with sticky prices and frictions in the nancial markets. The
analysis of the factors that explain economic growth is a well-known eld of study, and
the inclusion of nancial rigidities in macro models is not unusual nowadays, especially
since the outbreak of the nancial crisis. Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, the
two analyses have never been merged. It is uncommon to combine economic growth with
monetary issues, even less so with models with nancial frictions that usually address
short-term relationships. Economic growth is considered a long-term phenomenon that
should not be taken into account when analyzing the short-term behavior. However,
short-run dynamic macroeconomic models are built around a trend which must be con-
sistent with economic growth. If none of the short-term elements a¤ects the steady state,
so that the latter acts only as a trend reference, this distinction would not be ignoring
anything important.
By contrast, if any feature of the short-term behavior alters the steady state, then
the situation is quite di¤erent. Disregarding long and short-term interactions would then
cause a misunderstanding of the macroeconomic behavior, not only in the short but also
in the long run. This chapter widens the macroeconomic benchmark model by considering
10
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a range of issues that have not yet been addressed simultaneously in order to derive some
key implications for the monetary policy performance. We design a theoretical model
which combines elements that may be critical for the interactions between the short and
long term by modifying the DSGE New Keynesian framework.
To adopt the long-term perspective, we include endogenous economic growth driven
by the stock of knowledge generated by capital accumulation. In addition, we consider
nancial frictions in the credit markets. We also allow the central bank to implement
unconventional monetary policy in crisis periods by direct lending to non-nancial rms.
Finally, we remove the assumption of zero ination in the steady state. With all these
elements, we focus on the relationship between real and nancial variables and the per-
formance of monetary policy in the short and the long run.
Macroeconomic research has developed accurate models to evaluate monetary pol-
icy including nominal rigidities, among them, Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets and
Wouters (2003, 2007). However, the assumption that nancial markets are completely
exible has been prevalent in the academic literature. Bearing in mind the facts discussed
above, it seems that the rigidities in the credit markets, the latter being strategic for the
economic system, have amplied and extended the impact of the crisis. The critical
importance of these markets for the performance of the monetary policy has attracted
interest since Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist published their seminal paper in 1999 in
which they introduce the so-called nancial accelerator. The basic idea of this approach
is the amplifying e¤ects that credit markets have on business cycles due to the rigidities
in this sector which are based on the limitation of non-nancial rms in obtaining invest-
ment funds as a result of their balance sheet constraints. Other works that highlight the
importance of nancial rigidities are Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Holmstrom and Tirole
(1997) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997). Recently, Kiyotaki and Moore (2008), Chris-
11
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tensen and Dib (2008), Brunnermeier (2009) and Christiano et al. (2010) have examined
several topics related to this issue from di¤erent angles. An excellent survey of past and
recent work is Brunnermeier et al. (2012). These studies conclude that the e¤ects of
monetary policy shocks are larger and more persistent when taking nancial frictions
into account.
Given the recent altered ow of credit and the resulting slowdown in the economic
recovery, as well as the reaching of the zero lower bound of nominal interest rates, one
of the various proceedings taken by central banks to solve the nancial distress has been
to implement unconventional monetary policy measures by issuing direct loans or by
injecting immediate liquidity into nancial institutions. Such policies are designed to
soften the negative e¤ects of disruptions related to the valuation of assets, but the study
of their consequences is still at an early stage, as noted by Joyce et al. (2012). These
authors also point out the lack of e¤ectiveness and accuracy of this type of policy. A
deeper study of credit policy and unconventional monetary policy from a macroeconomic
point of view is, therefore, worth considering. Curdia and Woodford (2011) compute the
e¤ects of this credit policy examining several instruments, heterogeneity across agents and
di¤erent monetary policy rules. In Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2010), the response under di¤erent intensities of credit policy is studied. However, unlike
these business cycles studies, we will try to identify the consequences of this kind of
unconventional policies in the short and long-term by adapting the structure of nancial
intermediaries proposed by Gertler and Karadi (2011). In this work, an agency problem
is introduced whereby nancial intermediaries are restricted in their leverage position to
providing funds. What we obtain when we consider economic growth in this framework
is that the e¤ect of these measures is not restricted to the business cycles, but also a¤ects
the long-run scenario.
12
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We introduce endogenous growth into the New Keynesian framework. There are few
precedents in this eld, among them, Hiroki (2009), Rannenberg (2009), Amano et al.
(2009, 2012), Inoue and Tsuzuki (2010), Annicchiarico et al. (2011) and Vaona (2012).
However, none of these studies consider the nancial sector. Some works combining
endogenous economic growth and the nancial sector analyze the e¤ects of the degree
of nancial development in neoclassical growth models, as in Levine (1997), but do not
include nominal rigidities or monetary policy rules.
Short-term interest rate has been revealed as an e¤ective and quick instrument of
monetary policy, but also quite sensitive. As a consequence, the probability of taking a
non-optimal decision is high. The choice of variables to be considered when setting the
objectives and instruments of the decision-making process and their correct denition is
of great importance, both in the short and in the long term. For this reason, one element
that we consider essential to address the long-term analysis is the non-null ination rate
in the steady state, that is, trend ination (hereafter TI). Mainstream monetary policy
literature supposes that TI is zero, arguing analytical convenience or that it represents
an optimal solution in cashless models. However, evidence shows that this is not a
realistic assumption, since most central banks set positive targets on ination rate in
the medium-term, and the estimations of the long-run ination rate are always greater
than zero. Several contributions, including Ascari (2004), Hornstein and Wolman (2005),
Sahuc (2006), Amano et al. (2007), Kiley (2007), Bakhshi et al. (2007), Cogley and
Sbordone (2008), Ascari and Ropele (2007, 2009) and Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011),
have examined this issue by focusing on the validity of the conclusions about monetary
policy in the New Keynesian models when modifying this assumption. They nd that its
relaxation changes the short and medium-term properties of the models. Among other
outcomes, these studies conclude that the results obtained when including zero TI are
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not, in general, robust. In particular, the slope of the New Keynesian Phillips curve
decreases with the TI and the output gap has less inuence in determining the ination
rate. The only works that have combined TI and long-term growth have been Amano
et al. (2009, 2012), who nd a great loss in the steady-state output arising from the
presence of TI, and Vaona (2012), who nds a non-linear relationship between ination
and economic growth in a context in which monetary policy is not established by setting
the nominal interest rate but through the quantity of money. The presence of nancial
frictions is omitted in all these papers.
Once trend ination, nancial frictions and economic growth are simulaneously con-
sidered in a New Keynesian model, our results show that the current monetary policy
generates interactions between real and nancial variables that are reected in a direct
link between the long-term economic growth rate and the marginal gain from expanding
assets in the nancial system, given the value of the TI. As this value is given by the mon-
etary policy rule, where the nominal short-term interest rate is decided, monetary policy
disrupts the connection between economic growth and the protability of the nancial
sector not only in the cycle, but also in the trend. In this context, both nancial and real
variables are sensitive to the level of TI in the long run and there is a set of interesting
non-linear relationships between them in the steady state. In a calibrated model based
on the one developed in Gertler and Karadi (2011), the main nding is that the long-
run growth rate, welfare, normalized investment and nancial wealth are maximized at a
trend ination of 1.7%, whilst leverage, the external nance premium and the marginal
gain of nancial intermediaries are minimized.
The long-run relevance of TI disappears whenever there are not price rigidities but the
connection between the growth rate and the nancial variables is not a¤ected. Alterna-
tively, this last connection disappears without nancial frictions, remaining the non-linear
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relationship between the growth rate and TI. Consequently, the growth rate is indepen-
dent of TI and nancial variables without price rigidities and nancial frictions.
After the steady state is studied, we analyze the response of the model to a monetary
and a technology shock, showing that the level of TI a¤ects the amplitude of the reactions
for the rst shock. Moreover, if we trigger a simulated crisis, the unconventional monetary
policy alters the magnitude and persistence of the e¤ect of the shock, extending its e¤ects
to the long term.
As noted before, some features of our macroeconomic model have been studied pre-
viously. However, the fundamental result we nd is innovative as it combines economic
growth, TI and nancial frictions in a New Keynesian model. The main nding is the
inuence of the TI, set by the monetary policy rule, in determining the rate of economic
growth through the marginal gain of the nancial system. These three variables, which
ultimately synthesize the long-term economic performance and are also important for the
short term, are closely linked in both time perspectives.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, the theoretical model
is developed, as well as the study of the main relationships in the steady state. Section
3 is devoted to calibrating the model, to analyzing the steady state numerically and to
subjecting the model to monetary policy and technology shocks in di¤erent scenarios
depending on the level of TI considered. In Section 4, we analyze the response of the
variables to a capital quality shock under di¤erent intensities of credit policy. Finally, Sec-
tion 5 summarizes the main ndings. Appendix A1, A2 and A3 displays the normalized
model, the steady-state equations and the log-linear model, respectively.
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1.2 The model
The model proposed is a modication of the standard DSGE New Keynesian macro-
economic model which combines price rigidities, endogenous capital accumulation and
spill-over e¤ects à la Romer (1986) as the source of economic growth. Financial frictions
have been included following Gertler and Karadi (2011), henceforth GK, and non-zero
trend ination is allowed. The model considers the presence of six types of agents in the
economy: households, intermediate good rms, capital producers, retail rms, nancial
intermediaries and the central bank. The agents are characterized as follows:
1. Household members work, consume and save, holding their deposits in nancial
intermediaries.
2. Intermediate goods rms operate in perfect competition markets. These rms buy
capital and rent labor force in order to produce their goods. They are nanced with
their own funds, but the purchase of capital is funded through bank loans.
3. Capital producers, whose behavior is characterized by an investment function that
includes adjustment costs, sell their production to intermediate goods rms.
4. Retail rms acquire and di¤erentiate intermediate goods and sell them to house-
holds, setting their prices à la Calvo.
5. Financial intermediariesliabilities are the householdsdeposits, whilst net wealth
and loans granted to intermediate goods producers are their assets. The granting
of loans has an upper limit which depends on the intermediariesleverage.
6. The central bank implements monetary policy both conventional, through the mod-
ication of the short-term nominal interest rate following a Taylor rule, and non-
conventional, by direct lending to intermediate goods rms.
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1.2.1 Agents
Households
Households are composed of innite horizon individuals uniformly distributed in a con-
tinuum [0; 1]. Each household has a fraction  of its members bankers and a fraction
(1  ) workers. Each banker manages a nancial institution and transfers the prots
to his household. The workers produce goods earning the competitive wage. Households
consume and allocate their savings as bonds and deposits in the nancial intermediaries.
Their expected utility is dened as follows:
Et
1X
i=0
i
"
logCt+i   N
1+'
t+i
1 + '
#
(1.1)
where  2 (0; 1) is the subjetive discount factor, Ct is the consumption, Nt is the
labor supply,  > 0 is the relative utility weight of labor and ' > 0 determines the
intertemporal estasticity of the labor supply (inverse of Frisch elasticity).
Additionally, households must fulll the budget constraint, which does not allow the
present value of the expenditures to exceed the sum of the income and the value of the
initial assets:
Ct +
Dt
Rt
= Dt 1 +  t +WtNt   Tt (1.2)
where Dt are real one-period life deposits and nominally riskless discount bonds that
households hold in their portfolios, Rt is the real gross interest rate,  t are real rms
prots and payouts from rms and nancial intermediaries, Wt is the real wage and Tt
are the lump sum taxes.
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Moreover, we add the following restriction to avoid Ponzi schemes (Galí, 2008):
lim
T!1
Et fDTg  0 (1.3)
Solving the households utility maximization problem, we obtain the labor supply
optimality condition and the Euler equation:
Wt = CtN
'
t (1.4)
Ett;t+1Rt = 1 (1.5)
with
t;T = 
T t Ct
CT
where T = t+ 1 (1.6)
Intermediate goods rms
Each intermediate goods producer is indexed by j 2 [0; 1] and obtains the production at
time t by incorporating the capital acquired at the end of period t 1 and by renting labor
force to the households. The markets of both productive factors are competitive. The
rms have a Cobb-Douglas production function, common to all of them, that generates
economic growth à la Romer (1986):
Y ijt = e
at
 
etKjt

(KtNjt)
1  where 0 <  < 1 (1.7)
Y ijt is the production obtained by rm j with a capital stock Kjt and labor Njt.
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The index Kt =
R 1
0
Kjtdj is the stock of knowledge generated by capital accumulation,
which rms take as given, and will be the source of economic growth driving the total
factor productivity. t and at are shocks common to all rms. The rst is the capital
quality shock and the second the aggregate productivity shock, both following rst order
autoregressive processes of the type:
at = aat 1 + u
z
t (1.8)
t = t 1 + u

t (1.9)
where a;  2 [0; 1) measure the degree of persistence of the shocks and uat ; ut are
random errors. By aggregating the production functions of the rms, assuming that they
are identical and the capital-labor ratio is common across them, we have:
Y it = e
at
 
et

KtN
1 
t (1.10)
Moreover, these rms fund capital purchases by issuing nancial claims in period t
(St), whose relative prices will be the capital price (Qt):
QtSt = QtKt+1 (1.11)
The real wage (1.12) can be obtained by minimizing costs. Moreover, given that
intermediate good producers do not obtain prots and return the used capital to capital
producers with a relative price equal to unity, the yield of the nancial claims is equivalent
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to the expected capital return (Rqt ):
Wt = P
i
t (1  )
Y it
Nt
(1.12)
Et

Rqt+1
	
=
P it+1Y
i
t+1
et+1Kt+1
+Qt+1   
Qt
et+1 (1.13)
where P it is the relative price of intermediate goods and 0 <  < 1 the depreciation
rate.
Capital producers
The physical capital stock, whose net investment is produced with adjustment costs, is
dened as follows1:
Kt+1 = Kt + I
n
t (1.14)
Int = It   Kt (1.15)
Int being the net investment and It the gross investment. At the beginning of each
period, capital producers convert the used capital, which has been acquired from interme-
diate goods producers, into new capital and resell it to them, along with the newly-created
capital. The refurbished capital does not entail adjustment costs, but only the net invest-
ment. If we formulate the investment decision problem, which is common to all capital
1We have not included the shock that a¤ects the quality of capital in these equalities, as we maintain
that it should only be included in the equations relating to the productive sector of the economy.
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producers, we can obtain the capital price. This problem is the following:
maxEt
1X
T=t
t;T
(
QT I
n;k
T  
"
In;kT + f
 
In;kT + I
k
In;kT 1 + Ik
!
In;kT + I
k
#)
(1.16)
where In;kt =
Int
Kt
and Ik = I
K
is the value of the gross investment-capital ratio in the
steady state. The functional form of the adjustment costs is:
f
 
In;kT + I
k
In;kT 1 + Ik
!
=
&
2
 
In;kT + I
k
In;kT 1 + Ik
  1
!2
(1.17)
where & > 0, f(1) = f 0(1) = 0 and f 00(1) > 0
The price of the new capital is obtained from the rst order condition:
Qt = 1 + f +
In;kt + I
k
In;kt 1 + Ik
f 0   Ett;t+1
 
In;kt+1 + I
k
In;kt + I
k
!2
f 0 (1.18)
Retail rms
Each retailer di¤erentiates a unit of intermediate good by re-packaging it. The nal
output Yt is composed of a continuum of retail nal goods:
Yt =
Z 1
0
Y
( 1)=
st ds
 
 1
(1.19)
where Yst is the output of retailer s. If users of the nal output minimize costs:
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Yst =

Pst
Pt
 
Yt (1.20)
Pt =
Z 1
0
P 1 st ds
 1
1 
(1.21)
where Pst is the price of Yst and Pt is the price index of the nal output.
In order to include nominal rigidities, we follow the model of Calvo (1983). Conse-
quently, we assume that retailers will adjust their prices each period with an exogenous
probability (1  ), which is constant and common to all of them. Thus, the maximization
problem of the rms, assuming zero TI, can be stated as follows:
max
P t
1X
i=0
it;t+iEt

Yst+i

P t
Pt+i
  P it+i

(1.22)
s:t: Yst+i =

P t
Pt+i
 
Yt+i
where P t is the price set by those rms which change it at time t. Expression (1.22)
can be rewritten by substituting the demand curve into the objective function in order
to eliminate Yst+i. This leads us to obtain the following rst order condition:
Et
1X
i=0
it;t+iEt
(
(1  )

P t
Pt+i
 
Yt+i
Pt+i
+ P it+i

P t
Pt+i
 
Yt+i
P t
)
= 0 (1.23)
We can solve this equation for P t and, after some rearrangements, arrive at the
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expression of the optimal price which is set by all rms:
P t = 
Et
P1
i=0 
it;t+i (Pt+i)
 Yt+iP
i
t+i
Et
P1
i=0 
it;t+i (Pt+i)
 1 Yt+i
(1.24)
where  = 
 1 is the markup. Additionally, the general price level follows this path:
Pt =

(1  ) (P t )1  +  (Pt 1)1 
 1
1  (1.25)
This is the standard derivation of the optimal price and the general price level without
trend ination. If we now abandon the  = 1 assumption,  being the gross ination rate
in the steady state, the price equations (1.24) and (1.25) should be modied accordingly.
We can now dene Xt =
P t
Pt
and Pt
Pt+i
= 1Qi
k=1 t+k
and obtain the expressions:
Xt = 
Et
P1
i=0 
it;t+i
Qi
k=1t+k

P it+iYt+i
Et
P1
i=0 
it;t+i
Qi
k=1t+k
 1
Yt+i
(1.26)
Xt =

1  
1   1t
 1
 1
(1.27)
Financial intermediaries
The structure of our nancial sector is based on the one developed by GK, who modify the
original idea of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). Since this section is a replication
of the GK model, we will only make a brief presentation in order to state notation and
describe the main relationships.
Financial intermediaries obtain funds from households and lend them to intermediate
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goods rms. Thus, nancial intermediaries are the link between savers and investors.
The balance of each intermediary f is represented as:
QtSft = Fft +Dft (1.28)
Fft is the net wealth held by the intermediary at the end of period t, Dft are the
deposits created by households which are remunerated at an interest rate Rt+1, Sft is
the number of nancial claims issued by goods producers that the intermediary has in
its portfolio and Qt is the price of each claim. R
q
t+1 is the yield obtained by the nancial
intermediary derived from these claims. Therefore, the evolution of the banks wealth
depends on the external nance premium
 
Rqt+1  Rt+1

:
Fft+1 =
 
Rqt+1  Rt+1

QtSft +Rt+1Fft (1.29)
Financial intermediaries provide funds if and only if they do not obtain losses with
their operations, that is, if the external nance premium is equal to or greater than zero:
Ett;t+1+i
 
Rqt+1+i  Rt+1+i
  0 i  0 (1.30)
This condition always holds with equality under the assumption of frictionless nancial
markets. However, if these markets are imperfect, this relationship could be positive. In
this way, the bankers maximize their expected wealth:
Vft = maxEt
1X
i=0
(1  ) it;t+1+i
 
Rqt+1+i  Rt+1+i

Qt+iSft+i +Rt+1+iFft+i

(1.31)
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where  is the probability of survival of the bankers. Furthermore, we introduce the
GK agency problem in order to limit the expansion of assets, which would occur if the
inequality (1.30) is positive. The bankers have the opportunity to divert a proportion 
of the available funds towards their households at the beginning of each period. However,
if this occurs, the depositors can force bankruptcy and recover the proportion (1  ) of
available funds. Therefore, the depositors are willing to lend their funds to the bankers
whenever the following equation holds:
Vft  QtSft (1.32)
meaning that the gain from diverting a fraction  of assets is lower than the loss of
doing it. We can write:
Vft = vtQtSft + htFft (1.33)
where vt is the marginal gain of the banks derived from expanding their assets, QtSft,
maintaining their net wealth xed. It can be expressed as:
vt = Et

(1  ) t;t+1
 
Rqt+1  Rt+1

+ t;t+1xt;t+1vt+1
	
(1.34)
ht is the expected value of having an additional unit of Fft, assuming that Sft remains
constant, with the following denition:
ht = Et f(1  ) + t;t+1tt;t+1ht+1g (1.35)
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xt;t+i =
Qt+iSft+i
QtSft
is the growth rate of assets and tt;t+i =
Fft+i
Fft
is the growth rate of
wealth. Constraint (1.32) can also be expressed as follows:
htFft + vtQtSft  QtSft (1.36)
When this constraint binds we have an equality. With Fft > 0 and vt > 0 the bankers
obtain prots by expanding their assets and we have vt < . Thus, the maximum amount
of funds that the intermediaries can raise depends on their wealth, which can be stated
as:
QtSft =
ht
  vtFft = 
p
tFft (1.37)
where pt can be interpreted as the private leverage ratio. This ratio increases with vt
and its limit is the point at which the gain of diverting funds is o¤set by its cost, since
the increase of this variable in turn augments the opportunity cost of being forced into
bankruptcy. We can now rewrite (1.29) as follows:
Fft+1 =
 
Rqt+1  Rt+1

pt +Rt+1

Fft (1.38)
If we now redene the variables tt;t+1 and xt;t+1, we obtain that:
tt;t+1 =
Fft+1
Fft
=
 
Rqt+1  Rt+1

pt +Rt+1 (1.39)
xt;t+1 =
Qt+1Sft+2
QtSt+1
=
pt+1
pt
Fft+1
Fft
=
pt+1
pt
tt;t+1 (1.40)
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Given that the bankstotal demand does not depend on rm-specic factors, we can
aggregate it, which leads us to the following equation:
QtSt = 
p
tFt (1.41)
If we now distinguish between the wealth of the new (F nt ) and the old (F
o
t ) bankers,
the total wealth can be stated as:
Ft = F
o
t + F
n
t (1.42)
where
F ot = 

(Rqt  Rt)pt 1 +Rt

Ft 1 (1.43)
Finally, the initial funds2 of the new bankers are dened as the ratio !
1  of the old
bankerswealth, which corresponds to (1  )QtSt 1. This leads us to the following
expression:
F nt = !QtSt 1 (1.44)
Combining (1.43) and (1.44), we obtain the evolution of the net wealth:
Ft = 

(Rqt  Rt)pt 1 +Rt

Ft 1 + !QtSt 1 (1.45)
2These funds are transferred by the households.
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Central bank
The central bank is responsible for implementing monetary policy. It takes decisions
about the short-term nominal interest rate (Rstt ) in each period following a Taylor rule
that is specied below:
Rstt = R

t

 Yt
Y
y
et (1.46)
where R is the intercept reecting the structural factors in the reaction function of
the central bank (which can also be interpreted as the natural interest rate),  is the
steady-state gross ination or target, Y is the steady-state level of output consistent with
, ; y are, respectively, the parameters that measure the central banks reaction to
ination and output deviations from their steady-state levels, and the monetary policy
shock t is dened as an AR(1) process:
t = t 1 + u

t (1.47)
where  2 [0; 1) and ut is the random error.
Finally, the relationship between the real and nominal interest rate is set by the Fisher
equation:
Rstt = RtEtt+1 (1.48)
During specic periods in which the private nancial system is unable to provide the
necessary liquidity to non-nancial rms due to balance sheets constraints, the central
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bank can act as a direct lender to the intermediate goods producers3. Scbt denotes the
amount of loans issued by the central bank, assessed at the price of capital, and Spt the
nancial claims intermediated by nancial intermediaries, so the total amount of loans
can be stated as follows:
QtSt = QtS
p
t +QtS
cb
t (1.49)
To support these credit measures, the central bank issues riskless debt Dcbt , purchased
by households, and pays the market lending rate Rt+1. Although these operations are
not restricted by intermediariesbalance sheets, they do have associated e¢ ciency costs
 . The central bank is willing to pay a proportion  t of all claims, obtaining a prot of
Dcbt
 
Rqt+1  Rt+1

:
Dcbt = QtS
cb
t =  tQtSt (1.50)
Therefore, we can rewrite equation (1.49) to incorporate this lending mechanism:
QtSt = 
p
tFt +  tQtSt = 
T
t Ft (1.51)
where Tt is the leverage ratio of total intermediated funds:
Tt =
1
1   t
pt (1.52)
3Model results do no change if the central bank indirectly lends to non-nancial rms via nancial
intermediaries, as GK point out.
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The cost of intervention is funded with taxes and prots from nancial intermediation.
This is reected in the following equation:
 tQtKt+1 = Tt +D
cb
t 1 (R
q
t  Rt) (1.53)
We analyze the e¤ects of this kind of monetary policy specically in Section 1.4.
1.2.2 Equilibrium conditions
The aggregate equilibrium of the economy is dened as follows:
Yt = Ct + It + f
 
In;kt + I
k
In;kt 1 + Ik
!
(Int + I) +  tQtKt+1 (1.54)
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that there are no other public expenditures than
those derived from the e¢ ciency costs of the unconventional monetary policy. The total
output of the economy weighted by the price dispersion t =
1R
0

Pst
Pt
 
ds is equivalent
to the intermediate goods rmsoutput.
Y it = tYt (1.55)
Assuming that the price distribution between rms that do not change their price is
the same as the full price distribution in period t, we can obtain that:
t+1 = 

t+1t + (1  )X t+1 (1.56)
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Including these three equations, the model is closed.
1.2.3 Steady-state equilibrium
Since our aim is to analyze the long-term behavior of the model, it is necessary to precisely
dene the steady state and the key relationships that emerge in this situation. Because
our model incorporates economic growth, some of the variables grow in the steady state,
so the model must be normalized to show constant steady values. In order to do this, the
normalization of the growing variables (wt; Ct; Kt; It; Int ; Yt; Y
i
t ; Ft; F
o
t ; F
n
t ) by the capital
is needed. Economic growth is represented by the gross growth rate of capital Gt = KtKt 1 .
We detail the normalized model in Appendix A1, where normalized variables are denoted
with a superscript k. The equations of the normalized model evaluated in the steady
state are reported in Appendix A2, where the variables without a time subscript are the
steady-state values. The solution of the system is characterized by the pair of values of
G and v that, given the TI, satisfy the following two relationships:
G =
(1  )2 !
(1   ) [ (1  )  v]
h
1  G


 v
i (1.57)
G =
1
1 +  
(

X	
"
1

  (1  )X	



	X
 (1+')
1 
#
+ (1  )
)
(1.58)
where  =
h
1 + [(1 ) v]v
(1 )( v)

G

  (1  )
i
,  = (1   1), 	 = (1  ) and
X =

1 
1  1
 1
 1 .
It is clear that  = 	 = X = 1 whenever  = 0. Then, G is independent of TI
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without price rigidities but is a¤ected by v. If there is not nancial frictions Rq = R and,
hence, v = 0. Thus, (1.57) is not relevant and G in (1.58) is independent of the nancial
variables, provided  =  = 0, but the dependence on TI remains. Consequently, G
is independent of TI and the nancial variables without price rigidities and nancial
frictions.
Equations (1.57) and (1.58) are obtained as equations (A2.29) and (A2.32) in Appen-
dix A2. The rst contains the pair of values (G, v) compatible with equilibrium in the
nancial sector and the second in the goods market, given the value of TI. They determine
the steady-state equilibrium in the plane fG; vg given the value of  targeted by the mon-
etary policy. We should note that, unlike GK, we have endogeneized all the steady-state
values including the private leverage ratio. The existence of this relationship between the
economic growth rate and the marginal gain of the nancial intermediaries for expanding
their assets (which determines key factors such as the private leverage ratio), indicates
that nancial variables a¤ect economic growth in the long term. This is a key result of our
analysis. The variable v which, in turn, depends positively on the dynamics of the stock
of credit accumulated and on the discounted expected external nance premium (the two
components of the expected prots of the nancial intermediaries) is the essential link
through which the nancial system a¤ects the growth rate in the long run. Thus, the
credit available in the economic system and its expected returns will determine the pace
and the trend of the real activity. Moreover, the fact that the relationship between G
and v in the steady state depends on TI establishes a leading role for the monetary policy
through the inuence of the nancial activity in the growth process and its dependence
on the external nance premium, not only in the performance of the nancial system but
also in the growth of the economy. We will study this mechanism more deeply in the
calibration section.
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Table 1.1: Parameter values
Parameter Interpretation Value
 Discount term 0.99
 Participation of capital 0.332
 Depreciation rate 0.03
 Relative utility weight of labor 14.1
 Probability of keeping prices xed 0.779
& Investment adjustment costs 5.85
 Survival rate of the bankers 0.97
 Fraction of bank assets that can be diverted 0.382
! Wealth proportion of the new bankers 0.002
' Elasticity of labor supply 0.276
 Elasticity of substitution 4.167
 Coe¢ cient of ination in the Taylor rule 2.05
y Coe¢ cient of output gap in the Taylor rule 0.5/4
a Technology shock persistence 0.9
e Monetary shock persistence 0.5
 Central bank e¢ ciency costs 0.01
 Steady state value of credit policy 0.001
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1.3 Calibration, steady state and shocks
In this section we evaluate the model numerically in order to ascribe the values of the
variables in the steady state and their responses to some selected shocks. Table 1.1 shows
the values assigned to the parameters.
The values of the parameters ; ;  are standard in the literature. The remaining
parameter values like ; '; ; &; ; y and those related to nancial variables such as ; 
and ! are taken from GK. The exception is the parameter that reects the relative
utility weight of labor, calibrated to get an annual growth of 2.5% in our benchmark
scenario where annual TI is also 2.5%. This calibration ensures a stable steady state
and reasonable rates of economic growth, interest rate spread and private leverage at any
level of trend ination without reducing the consistency of the model.
With these values as a reference, the steady state is analyzed in a rst subsection and
the e¤ects of two types of shocks are described in a second one.
1.3.1 Steady-state analysis
Given the values of the parameters, we can nd the steady-state solution in the plane
fv;Gg. In the benchmark scenario, this point is fv = 0:0052; G = 1:0062g. Accordingly,
when the incentive constraint (1.36) binds with F k > 0 we have 0 < v <  . The two main
equations which determine the steady state are plotted in Figure 1.1, where the red line
corresponds to equation (1.57) and the blue line to equation (1.58). The crossing point
determines the values of G and v that make the equilibrium in the nancial sector and
in the goods market simultaneously possible. We see that, while the function containing
the equilibrium points in the nancial sector is not monotonous, the equilibrium points
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in the goods market show an inverse relationship between G and v in a relevant range of
values (0 < v < ). This U-shaped relationship between G and v in the nancial sector is
an interesting structural characteristic of the model that provides remarkable subsequent
results related to the TI. These outcomes follow from the fact that, while the U-shaped
relationship does not depend on the TI, the other function does.
Figure 1.1: Steady-state equilibrium
Taking the pair of values mentioned above as our point of departure, from the equa-
tions dened in Appendix A2 we can obtain the values of the remaining variables. The
private leverage ratio is 4.85, a level consistent with the results of GK, and the external
nance premium is 117 basis points, a reasonable value given the TI considered.
However, these results depend on the value targeted for the TI. If we consider the
scenarios within a wide range [ 5%; 8%] of the annualized rate of TI, one of the most
interesting results obtained concerns the non-linear relationship between the long-run
growth rate and the TI, as we show in the rst plot of Figure 1.2. It can be seen how
the long-term growth rate and the TI are positively related up to a maximum value
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located around 1.7% of the annualized TI4, after which the growth rate declines faster.
Normalized investment and normalized nancial wealth also peaks at TI =1.7%, whilst
the marginal gain of the nancial intermediaries, the external nance premium and the
private leverage reach their minimum. Regarding other variables, normalized nal output,
normalized consumption and real wage are highest when TI=0.5%, while the price of
intermediate goods reaches its maximum at TI =1%. Although normalized variables
reach their respective maximums for di¤erent levels of trend ination, Figure 1.2 shows
in the last row that, at a point in time far enough away, which would be equivalent to
the steady state, the householdswelfare specied in equation (1.1) is maximized when
TI =1.7%. The last plot displays the deviations from the values5 when TI=1.7% for the
main variables.
These ndings suggest that there is an optimal level of TI that maximizes growth and
welfare, as is also concluded in Amano et al. (2009). The di¤erence in our conclusion
is that the optimal value of TI does not imply deation. Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and
Wieland (2010) do not include endogenous growth in their model, but also nd an optimal
rate for positive but low levels of TI.
Thus, a shift in the TI alters the steady-state values of the real variables. The re-
lationship between TI and growth suggests that the monetary policy goal of stabilizing
ination around a certain level could be conditioning economic growth and output level
in the long term6. Therefore, given that monetary policy a¤ects TI through the specica-
tion and targets of the monetary policy rules and the way those rules react to deviations
in the ination rate, monetary policy not only a¤ects business cycles, but also modies
4The exact value is 1.72%.
5Growth is plotted as percentage points di¤erential.
6The relationship is due to price rigidities. All the conclusions are unchanged for reasonable values
of .
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the long-run equilibrium. This result highlights that monetary policy is not neutral in
the long term, conrming conclusions recently reached by, among others, Amano et al.
(2009) and Vaona (2012) in di¤erent and more restricted contexts as they do not consider
the role played by the nancial sector.
Figure 1.2: Steady-state values
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To understand the mechanism described above is crucial in order to examine the be-
havior of the variables pertaining to the nancial sector. Figure 1.2 shows the relationship
between the TI and some essential nancial variables. The relationship between the TI
and the external nance premium is non-linear since, for low rates, it decreases but, from
the level of TI that maximixes the growth rate, it increases. After that level, the short-
ening of the capital return is lower than the reduction of the real interest rate, so the
marginal gain for the nancial intermediaries to expand their assets goes up and, accord-
ingly, the private leverage ratio increases. The increase in this ratio lowers the net wealth
held by the intermediaries and, consequently, capital growth falls. The coincidence of
the TI level that maximixes the growth rate with the lowest values of the marginal gain
of the nancial intermediaries and the external nance premium is an outstanding result
in our model. In fact, the real interest rate and the capital return are also maximum
with this value of TI. This is a consistent set of symmetrical results that strengthen our
approach.
We now carry out a sensitivity analysis in order to check the robustness of our results as
well as to determine the impact on the long-run equilibrium of changes in the parameters
that reect the structure of the nancial system. Figure 1.3 displays the di¤erential in
percentage points related to the benchmark steady state of our two key variables, v and
G, for a wide range of values of the nancial sector parameters ; ; !;  and  . First, we
should note that the e¤ects of the parameters are opposite on the marginal gain of the
nancial intermediaries and on the economic growth rate, whilst the level of TI barely
a¤ects the equilibrium shifts for di¤erent parameter values. Marginal gain rises whilst
economic growth diminishes with the fraction of capital that bankers can divert. This
means that the proportion of the potential unjustied economic losses su¤ered by the
nancial system a¤ects positively the nancial marginal gain and negatively the real
38
1.3. Calibration, steady state and shocks
Figure 1.3: Sensitivity analysis
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activity in the long run. Comparing the two extreme cases considered, the marginal
gain rate increases by 8 percentage points and growth decreases by 3. As regards the
survival rate of the bankers, the parameter that could represent the dynamic process
of entry and exit of intermediaries in the nancial system, economic growth increases
with its value. For example, if  = 0:91 instead of 0.97, which would be equivalent to
an easier entry, the steady-state growth rate would decrease one percentage point. This
suggests that mobility in the composition of the nancial system discourages long-term
growth. Furthermore, the higher the amount of funds that the new bankers begin with,
the higher the long-term growth. The e¢ ciency costs of the credit policy do not seem
to signicantly a¤ect either the nancial marginal gain or the economic growth. Finally,
the intensity of the unconventional monetary policy that the central bank carries out in
the steady state is positively related to growth. In the extreme case in which almost all
funds were mediated by the central bank in the steady state, economic growth would
increase by 0.8 percentage points over the benchmark case in which the central bank
intermediates only 0.1% of total funds, which is a very low proportion. As expected, the
marginal gain of private nancial intermediaries would fall more strongly the fewer funds
they intermediate.
1.3.2 Shocks
In Appendix A3 we linearize the equations of the normalized model in order to analyze
the trajectories of the variables under the proposed shocks. The denition of the Phillips
curve has a special importance as it includes, in our case, two such uncommon elements
as TI and growth. We follow the procedure of Bakhsi et al. (2007), which lead us to
obtain the following expression7:
7The accented lowercase letters are logarithmic deviations from steady state values.
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~t = 1Et~t+1 + 2Et~t+2 + 3~p
i
t + 4Et~p
i
t+1 + 5Et~g
y
t+1 (1.59)
where ~gyt = ~y
k
t   ~ykt 1 + ~gt are the output growth rate deviations and the coe¢ cient
values are:
1 =  [(1   1) ( (  1) + 1) +  (1 +  1)]
2 =  2
3 =
(1 )(1  1)
 1
4 =   (1   1) (1  )
5 =  (  1) (1   1)
Thus, ination depends on the ination expectations, the marginal costs of retailers
and the output gap growth rate. Note that, if  = 1, this expression is reduced to the
standard New Keynesian Phillips curve.
After linearization, to evaluate the model response we analyze two standard types
of shocks: a monetary policy shock and a technology shock. For each possible scenario,
Figures 1.4 and 1.5 show the deviations from each steady-state value of the main variables
expressed in percentage points across 80 quarters. The darker lines represent higher TI
and the lighter ones lower TI. We have reduced the considered range of TI to [0%; 5%] in
order to focus on the most probable scenarios as well as to appreciate the behavior above
and below 1.7%, the value that maximizes the growth rate in the steady state.
Firstly, to assess the impact and persistence of monetary policy on the dynamics of
the variables, we will submit the model to a standard monetary shock dened in equation
(1.47). Regarding the size of the shock, we will force an increase of 25 basis points in the
quarterly short-term nominal interest rate, which corresponds to an annual rate of 1%
not explained by the variables included in the monetary policy rule.
41
Chapter 1. Monetary Policy and Growth with Trend Ination and Financial Frictions
Figure 1.4: Responses to a monetary policy shock. % Deviation from the steady state
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Figure 1.4 shows the responses of both nancial and real variables for the di¤erent
values of TI. The growth rate decreases with more intensity when the steady-state ina-
tion rate is higher and, even though the e¤ect is slight, the di¤erence between extreme
scenarios is wide. The e¤ect diminishes gradually but remains for up to 20 years after the
shock, which is longer than in the standard New Keynesian model due to the nancial
accelerator mechanism. Normalized net investment response and its relationship with TI
is similar, though broader, to the growth rate response. Normalized output is less depen-
dent on the level of TI, although the initial impact of the shock produces a response 9%
higher when TI=5% than when TI=0%.
So far as the nancial variables are concerned, the e¤ects on the marginal gain for
expanding nancial assets, external nance premium, private leverage and the net wealth
of nancial intermediaries are larger when TI is higher. The sequence of the events is
as follows. The rise of the nominal interest rate results in an increase of the interest
rate di¤erential. This spread pushes up the marginal gain to expand the assets for the
intermediaries. Therefore, the private leverage ratio grows nearly 3% in the benchmark
scenario. The result of these movements is a decrease of the intermediary normalized net
wealth of 4% which nally causes a decline in the capital growth. The ination rate falls
as expected, without a clear e¤ect of the TI.
Therefore, it has been shown that an exogenous shock in the monetary policy rule
causes e¤ects on the real and nancial variables that depend on the TI level. These e¤ects
are greater for all variables the higher the TI level (except the ination rate, which is not
a¤ected by TI in terms of deviations from the steady-state level).
43
Chapter 1. Monetary Policy and Growth with Trend Ination and Financial Frictions
Figure 1.5: Responses to a technology shock. % Deviation from the steady state
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Secondly, we will study the e¤ects of the technology shock in (1.8). The disturbance
is a positive deviation of 1% in the total factor productivity included in the production
function. Figure 1.5 displays the impulse response functions of the variables.
Contrary to the monetary shock experiment, the response of the variables to a tech-
nology shock hardly depends on the TI considered. At the begining, the technology shock
slightly increases the growth rate without di¤erences but the increase is greater later the
lower is TI. Normalized investment increases up to 0.9% and these e¤ects remain for 20
years after the shock. Normalized output increases around 0.8%, and more with high
TI, and the response remains after 7 years. The e¤ects on the nancial variables are
similar for any TI. As a result of the rise in the external nance premium, asset prices
increase and the nancial intermediaries balance sheets improve. These movements lead
to a lowering of the marginal gain of the intermediaries and, therefore, to a deleveraging
process up to 10%. The 12% increase of the net wealth derived from the previous shifts
increases the growth rate and, lastly, the ination rate drops.
So far, we have analyzed conventional shocks, concluding that the magnitude and
persistence of the e¤ects of the monetary shock have been amplied by the nancial
accelerator, but also depend on the TI level. In the next section, we will force a crisis in
the economy in order to study the unconventional monetary policy.
1.4 Unconventional monetary policy
Hitherto we have assumed that the central bank only implements monetary policy by
setting the short-term nominal interest rate, that is, through conventional monetary
policy. Now let us assume that the central bank can also implement unconventional
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monetary policy by acting as a direct lender. Although the central bank has to bear
e¢ ciency costs in these interventions and, thus, is less e¢ cient than private intermediaries,
it does not face any restriction. The central bank has the power to act as a nancial
intermediary, but we assume, as GK do, that it only uses this power, to any extent,
during crisis periods. The crisis is characterized by a sudden drop in the quality of
capital, causing a rise in the external nance premium. These movements are consistent
with what has been seen during the nancial crisis. The evolution of the unconventional
monetary policy responds to the following pattern:
 t =  + b

Et
 
Rqt+1  Rt+1
  (Rq  R) (1.60)
where b is the policy parameter that represents the degree of central bank reaction to
deviations in the external nance premium from its steady-state value and  the steady-
state level of the unconventional monetary policy. We assume that  = 0:001, a positive
value but close to zero. The shock, dened in (1.9), is a 5% decline in the capital quality
with a persistence degree parameter of 0.66. The responses of the main variables in
percentage deviations from the steady-state level along 80 quarters are shown in Figure
1.6. We distinguish four degrees of intervention represented by parameter b (b = 0 or no
intervention, b = 10 or low intervention, b = 50 or medium intervention and b = 100 or
high intervention).
The consequences of this disturbance for the optimal TI and without the credit policy
are represented by the black line in Figure 1.6 and are characterized as follows8. The
reduction of the e¤ective level of capital generates a decline in the total assets value.
8We only present the results for the optimal level of trend ination, TI=1.7% for the sake of clarity
and because there are slight variations between scenarios for this type of shock.
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In addition, the deterioration of the position of the nancial intermediaries balance
sheets diminishes the demand for capital and, therefore, its price. Thus, the decline
in investment and its price causes a further deterioration in the balance sheets that is
amplied by the private leverage. Due to the fall in e¤ective capital, the interest rate
spread increases and, therefore, there is an increase in the marginal gain and drops in both
the normalized output and the normalized net investment. Ination increases initially but,
after ve quarters, it falls below the steady-state level.
We now focus on the di¤erences in the model response to the intensity of credit policy.
As can be seen in Figure 1.6, the response of the variables to this kind of shock depends
on the degree of the central bank intervention. Real variables, such as growth rate,
normalized output, normalized investment and its price, go down, as expected. Ination
and labor increase in the very initial periods to drop afterwards. The responses are clearly
dampened by central bank policies.
As regards nancial variables, the marginal gain of the nancial intermediaries de-
pends largely on the unconventional actions of the central bank. This variable increases
by 150% if the monetary authorities do not interfere, and only by 45% if they do so with
a high degree of intensity. In response to the shift in the marginal gain, private leverage
will also increase, in this case by more than 130% without intervention and only by 40%
with a high intervention. This movement is contrary to the predictions made by GK,
who describe a deleveraging process. In our model the private leverage ratio increases
considerably, as seen in the U.S. data9, where it can be observed how this ratio has in-
creased about 25% from 2008 to 2013 despite the substantial liquidity injections made
by the Federal Reserve. Finally, the normalized nancial wealth of intermediaries also
depends on the intensity of the policy. As in the previous section, nominal interest rate
9Source: SNL Financial. Core Capital as a percent of average total assets minus ineligible intangibles.
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does not reach its zero lower bound.
Figure 1.6: Responses to a capital quality shock and credit policy if =1.7%
% Deviation from the steady state
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Figure 1.6: Responses to a capital quality shock and credit policy if =1.7% (cont.)
% Deviation from the steady state
Another topic of interest is the persistence of the shock in terms of the intensity of
the unconventional monetary policy. As can be seen in Figure 1.6, this type of policies
mainly reduces the initial impact of the shock on the nancial variables. However, the
more intense the intervention, the greater the persistence of the e¤ects on all variables.
For example, in the case of intermediarieswealth, if the central bank does not interfere,
the e¤ects disappear within 10 years of the shock. Conversely, if the degree of intervention
is medium or high, the e¤ects endure for more than 20 years after the shock. Hence, the
general conclusion to be drawn is that the greater the intensity of the credit policy, the
lower the negative initial impact of the crisis but the longer the response of the variables
to a decrease in the value of capital.
Therefore, monetary authorities should adopt a long-term perspective weighting the
magnitude and persistence of the e¤ects on real and nancial variables in order to choose
the intensity of the unconventional monetary policy. The consideration of this perspective
could increase the accuracy of the policies that central banks implement in crisis periods.
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1.5 Conclusions
This chapter extends the standard New Keynesian DSGE model with endogenous eco-
nomic growth, nancial frictions and non-zero trend ination in order to get a suitable
framework to analyze the long-lasting e¤ects of monetary policy on real and nancial
variables. In the analysis of the steady state and the dynamics of the model, we nd that
both the nancial accelerator and the level of trend ination a¤ect economic growth in
the short and the long term.
After calibrating the model, we have studied the long-run behavior. Our model shows
the existence of a key link in the long run between the growth rate and the marginal gain
for the expansion of the nancial assets, given the value of the trend ination. A non-
linear relationship between the long-term growth rate and the trend ination is one of our
outstanding results where, in a model based on the one used in Gertler and Karadi (2011),
growth rate, normalized investment and normalized nancial wealth reach a maximum
when annualized trend ination is 1.7%, whilst the leverage, the external nance premium
and the marginal gain of the nancial intermediaries reach their minimum. This is a
symmetric and coherent set of results that show the strength of the long-run connections
between economic growth, the protability of the nancial sector and monetary policy.
The long-run relevance of the trend ination disappears whenever there is not price
rigidities, but the connection between the growth rate and the nancial variables is not
a¤ected. Alternatively, this last connection disappears without nancial frictions, re-
maining the non-linear relationship between the growth rate and the trend ination.
Consequently, the growth rate is independent of the trend ination and the nancial
variables without price rigidities and nancial frictions.
So, nancial variables a¤ect the steady-state equilibrium growth rate, especially the
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marginal gain for expanding the nancial assets, given the level of trend ination. Through
the sensitivity analysis of the nancial parameters, we have found that the structure of
the nancial sector has a well established set of implications for the long-run equilibrium,
keeping the trend ination constant. On the one hand, the rate of growth decreases with
the fraction of capital the bankers can divert. On the other hand, growth rate increases
with the rate of survival of the bankers, the initial capital of the new bankers and the
intensity of the unconventional monetary policy. The e¤ect on the marginal gain is the
opposite.
Then, we have focused on the dynamics of the model following the emergence of
di¤erent disturbances. The response of the main variables to a monetary policy shock is
higher when the trend ination is high. In the case of a technology shock, the dynamics
of the real and nancial variables are less dependent on trend ination.
Finally, with the aim of assessing the e¤ects of an unconventional monetary policy, we
have simulated a crisis by forcing a decline in the quality of capital. It has been shown
that real variables such as economic growth rate, output and investment are a¤ected by
the credit policy. Likewise, the response of nancial variables such as the marginal gain,
the leverage ratio or the nancial wealth of intermediaries also depends on the intensity
of the credit policy. Furthermore, when the credit policy is of higher intensity, although
the negative e¤ects of this shock are smaller at rst, mainly on the nancial variables,
their persistence is higher, lasting at least 20 years after the disturbance. Thus, we
demonstrate that more aggressive credit policies may lead to a prolongation of the e¤ects
of crises beyond the medium term.
In sum, it has been shown that, if the monetary authorities wish to encourage the
long-term economic growth, they should take care of the long-run non-linear connections
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between economic growth, the protability of the nancial sector and the ination target
of the monetary policy.
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Natural Rate of Interest, Monetary
Policy and Growth with Trend
Ination and Financial Frictions
2.1 Introduction
The long-run real rate of interest, also known as the natural rate of interest, has been
studied by academics since Knut Wicksell introduced it in the late nineteenth century.
Although there are various denitions of this concept, the most extended is the rate
that ensures aggregate price stability and the reaching of the potential output in the
absence of exogenous shocks or, as dened by Woodford (2003), the equilibrium real rate
of return when prices are fully exible. Nevertheless, its denition and importance have
been modied over time due to the progress in the understanding of the economy and
the changes in the tools used by the monetary authorities.
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The way that monetary policy is currently conducted by central banks, leaving aside
the monetary aggregates and using the nominal interest rate as the main instrument,
recovers a key role for the natural rate of interest. The link between monetary policy
and the natural rate of interest stems from the rules through which the macroeconomic
mainstream, the New Keynesian models, considers that monetary policy is conducted.
In these models, the nominal interest rate is set by rules in which the natural rate is
the intercept and somehow characterizes the stance of the monetary policy. In this
context, it is assumed that this rate is known exactly. However, the natural rate of
interest is unobservable, so central banks must estimate it. During this process, monetary
authorities could over or infraestimate the true value. A proof of this lack of accuracy is
the gap between the observed interest rates and those that would result from the rules,
as noted by Judd and Rudebusch (1998) and Orphanides (2003), who relate these gaps to
the uncertainty associated with the estimation of the unobservable variables. Therefore,
a deeper analysis of the fundamentals of the natural rate and the consequences of its
incorrect estimation becomes convenient.
The academic literature has made progress in the understanding of the natural rate
of interest in the context described above. Woodford (2001) discusses the uctuations of
this rate and its implications for the monetary policy. He argues that the natural rate
of interest varies across time in response to real disturbances, but is always supposed to
be accurately known. Woodford does not inquire about the possible implications of the
use of a rate di¤erent to the endogenous one. By contrast, Orphanides and Williams
(2002) consider that the estimated value introduced into the policy rule may di¤er from
the endogenous rate. They show that the cost of underestimating the natural rate of
interest is larger than the cost of overestimating it, considering the consequences in terms
of stabilizing the economy. Meanwhile, Tristani (2009) analyzes the determinants of the
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natural rate of interest and also raises the possibility that the value estimated by the
monetary authority may di¤er from the correct value. This author concludes that, if
there were such a di¤erential, the ination target would never be reached10. Moreover,
even if monetary authorities were able to know the exact law of motion of the natural rate
of interest, delays in obtaining reliable information could lead central banks to carry out
inaccurate policies in real time, as pointed out earlier in Levin, Wieland, and Williams
(1999) and recently in Arestis and Sawyer (2008) and Neri and Ropele (2012). Accord-
ingly, the unobservability of the natural rate of interest, the lags in obtaining precise
information and other drawbacks have led many authors to question its usefulness for the
accuracy of the monetary policy, as asserted by11 Clark and Kozicki (2005) and Weber,
Lemke and Worms (2008).
Nevertheless, and despite the di¢ culty of estimating the natural rate of interest,
its importance is decisive for policymakers since this variable is the element integrated
into the widely-used monetary rules which reects the information about changes in the
forces that guide the economy. Taylor and Williams (2010) analyze the optimal monetary
policy rules and conclude that the optimal coe¢ cients assigned to variables such as the
deviations of ination or the output gap change depending on the mismeasurements in
the natural rate of interest. Cúrdia et al. (2011) assert that the optimal monetary policy
rules have to integrate this rate and Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2012) show how the
rules perform better if the monetary authority can track the natural rate of interest12.
Besides, some relevant information may be overlooked in the estimation process or,
10Other works focus on connected issues such as the relationship between money and the natural rate
of interest (Andres, Lopez-Salido and Nelson, 2009) and the impact of misunderstandings in this rate on
the zero lower bound of the nominal interest rates (Williams, 2009).
11Alternative but related research studies the e¤ects of mismeasurements of the output gap on the
optimal monetary policy, such as Orphanides et al. (2000), Rudebusch (2001), McCallum (2001), Smets
(2002) and Orphanides (2003), among others.
12However, this nding depends on the framework employed because other approaches as Laxton and
Pesenti (2003) argue that ination-forecast-based rules perform better in small open economies.
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as Arestis and Sawyer (2008) pointed out, the theoretical assumptions imposed may not
be valid. Amato (2005) indicates that some features of nancial markets, such as the
existence of external nance premiums or agency problems, may a¤ect the natural rate
of interest by generating a wedge between the actual long-term interest rates and the
long-term natural rate. In addition, as outlined in that work, the literature has always
assumed that the steady-state ination is zero. However, many studies such as Ascari
(2004) and Cogley and Sbordone (2008), among others, have proposed that trend ination
is positive, in general, so the relaxation of this assumption could shift the equilibrium
and, thus, the natural rate of interest. Hence, the denition of the natural rate should
be modied. We can no longer understand it as the rate that ensures price stability, but
the rate which provides ination stability around a long-term level.
The need to know the value of the natural rate of interest has led the empirical
literature to estimate it and to analyze the gap between this rate and the short-term rate.
These estimates go beyond simple historical averages as they are not precise, particularly
in periods of a high variability of output gap and ination. One of the rst articles
that address this issue is Bomm (1997), who derives the natural rate of interest of
the U.S. by assessing the IS and the potential output curves. Laubach and Williams
(2003) estimate the time-varying natural rate of interest for the U.S., concluding that its
underestimation worsens macro stabilization. Moreover, as also noted by Tristani (2009),
they suggest that, if the natural rate included in the Taylor rule is not correctly estimated,
the ination target is never achieved. But they do not delve into the determination of the
fundamentals of this rate nor go beyond the mechanism which can be applied to verify
whether the monetary authority is deviated from the correct value.
The present chapter carries out an analysis of the determination of the natural rate
of interest as well as of the impact of the wrong identication of this rate, emphasizing
56
2.1. Introduction
the long-term perspective. The theoretical context is the modied New Keynesian model
with endogenous growth, nancial frictions and trend ination developed in Chapter 1.
Firstly, we obtain the steady state of the economy and the expression for the natural rate
of interest, identied as the long-run real interest rate, which depends on the long-run
growth rate and on the structure of the nancial system. Then, we conduct a sensitivity
analysis of the natural interest rate to changes in the parameters of the nancial sector,
determining how are the responses to shifts in the nancial structure.
Furthermore, when the central bank inaccurately estimates the natural rate of in-
terest, its value depends on both the wrong value and the ination target. Under this
assumption, it follows that the value estimated for the natural rate of interest is non-
neutral to monetary policy. The reason is found not only in the gap generated between
the targeted and the actual long-run ination when the central bank misunderstands the
natural rate, as Tristani (2009) and Laubach and Williams (2003) stated, but also in its
inuence on the long-run growth rate.
Delving into the relationship between the long-run growth rate and the potential
error in the natural rate estimate, we prove that it depends on the ination target. As
our model predicts that the long-term growth rate is maximized when the central bank
approaches a certain ination rate in the long run, this relationship will depend on the
di¤erential between this optimal ination rate and the ination target. We show that the
natural interest rate target can serve as a policy instrument. Specically, we demonstrate
that, in order to stimulate the long-term growth rate, if the ination target is below the
optimal one, the natural interest rate target should be lower than the endogenous rate.
Finally, we develop a procedure to monitor the accuracy of the estimate of the natural
rate based on our conclusions to verify whether the central bank is wrong and how to
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follow a path towards a more convenient or the true value.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, the theoretical model used is briey
presented. Section 3 is devoted to displaying the steady-state equations and to introduc-
ing our denition of the natural rate of interest, submitting this rate to a sensitivity
analysis. Section 4 presents the impact on the economys trend that mismeasurements of
the natural rate of interest would trigger. In Section 5, we design a procedure to verify
and correct the deviations from the true value of this rate. Finally, Section 6 summarizes
the main ndings.
2.2 Theoretical model
The theoretical setup used to derive the natural rate of interest and its characteristics is
fully developed in Chapter 1 so, here, we briey present it in order to make this chapter
self-contained. It is an adaptation of the benchmark New Keynesian DGSE model which
incorporates spill-over e¤ects as the source of economic growth. Following Gertler and
Karadi (2011), nancial frictions have been included and, nally, trend ination is allowed.
The model considers the presence of six types of agents in the economy: households,
capital producers, intermediate goods rms, nancial intermediaries, retail rms and the
central bank.
Households Households consume and use part of their savings to create deposits in the
nancial intermediaries. Each household has a fraction  of its members who are bankers,
who manage one nancial institution each and transfer the prots to their households,
and a fraction (1  ) who are workers, who produce goods and earn the competitive
wages. Their preferences are given by:
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Et
1X
t=0
i
"
logCt+i   N
1+'
t+i
1 + '
#
(2.1)
where  2 (0; 1) is the discount rate, Nt the labor supply,  > 0 the relative utility
weight of labor, ' the intertemporal estasticity of labor supply and Ct the consumption
of nal good. The householdsbudget constraint is:
Ct +
Dt
Rt
= Dt 1 +  t +WtNt   Tt (2.2)
where Dt are one-period life deposits and public debt, Rt is the real gross interest
rate,  t are rmsprots, Wt is the real wage and Tt are lump sum taxes. The labor
supply and the Euler equation are:
Wt = CtN
'
t (2.3)
Ett;t+1Rt = 1 (2.4)
with
t;T = 
T t Ct
CT
where T = t+ 1 (2.5)
Intermediate goods rms Intermediate goods producers obtain their output by using
the capital acquired and the labor force hired from the households. These rms have a
common production function that yields economic growth following Romer (1986):
Y ijt = e
atKjt (KtNjt)
1  (2.6)
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Y ijt being the production obtained by rm j with j pertaining to the interval [0,1], Kjt
the capital stock and Njt the labor used. The index Kt =
R 1
0
Kjtdj represents the stock
of knowledge generated by capital accumulation by all the intemediate producers, taken
as given by rms. at is the AR(1) productivity shock common to all rms. Aggregating
the rmsproduction functions and assuming that they are all identical:
Y it = e
atKtN
1 
t (2.7)
Furthermore, goods producers fund capital purchases by issuing nancial claims (St)
at a price Qt:
QtSt = QtKt+1 (2.8)
Denoting by P it the price of the intermediate good and  the depreciation rate, the
wage that minimizes costs and the capital return (Rqt ) are:
Wt = P
i
t (1  )
Y it
Nt
(2.9)
Et

Rqt+1
	
=
P it+1Y
i
t+1
Kt+1
+Qt+1   
Qt
(2.10)
Capital producers We dene the capital accumulation, a¤ected by adjustment costs,
as follows:
Kt+1 = Kt + I
n
t (2.11)
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where Int = It   Kt is the net investment and It the gross investment. Capital
producers refurbish depreciated capital adquired from intermediate goods producers and
resell it, along with newly-created capital, to goods producers. The solution to the
investment problem, common to all capital producers, leads to the relative price:
Qt = 1 + f +
In;kt + I
k
In;kt 1 + Ik
f 0   Ett;t+1

Int+1 + I
k
Int + I
k
2
f 0 (2.12)
where In;kt =
Int
Kt
, Ik = I
K
is the value of gross investment relative to capital in the
state steady and t;t+1 is the discount rate derived from the householdsdecision.
Retail rms These rms make use of intermediate goods, transforming them into
di¤erentiated nal goods following the Dixit-Stiglitz technology. In order to include
nominal rigidities, we follow the model of Calvo (1983). If we abandon the zero trend
ination assumption and dene Xt =
P t
Pt
and Pt
Pt+i
= 1Qi
k=1 t+k
, Pt being the nal good
price index, P t the optimal price in t and t the gross ination rate, the equations related
to xing prices are:
Xt = 
Et
P1
i=0 
it;t+i
Qi
k=1t+k

Yt+iP
i
t+i
Et
P1
i=0 
it;t+i
Qi
k=1t+k
 1
Yt+i
(2.13)
Xt =

1  
1   1t
 1
 1
(2.14)
where  is the probability of not changing the price,  = 
 1 is the mark-up of the
retailers and  is the parameter of the aggregate Dixit-Stiglitz index.
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Financial intermediaries The structure of our nancial market follows the approach
of Gertler and Karadi (2011). Financial intermediaries raise funds from households re-
munerated at Rt+1 and lend them to intermediate goods rms yielding a rate R
q
t+1. Their
objective function maximizes their expected wealth (Vft):
Vft = maxEt
1X
i=0
(1  ) it;t+1+i
 
Rqt+1+i  Rt+1+i

Qt+iSft+i +Rt+1+iFft+i

(2.15)
where  is the probability of survival of the bankers and Fft is the net wealth held by
intermediary f at the end of period t. Financial intermediaries provide funds if they do
not obtain losses or, analogously, the discounted external nance premium is greater than
zero. Furthermore, the bankers have the chance to divert a fraction  of the disposable
funds to their households. But, if this happens, the depositors could force the bankruptcy
of the nancial intermediary and rescue the proportion (1  ) of the available funds.
Thus, the depositors are willing to lend their funds to the bankers whenever the following
equation holds:
htFft + vtQtSft  QtSft (2.16)
where vt is the marginal gain of bankers derived from expanding their assets QtSft
but maintaining the net wealth xed and ht is the expected value of having an additional
unit of Fft, supposing that Sft remains constant:
vt = Et

(1  ) t;t+1
 
Rqt+1  Rt+1

+ t;t+1xt;t+1vt+1
	
(2.17)
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ht = Et f(1  ) + t;t+1tt;t+1ht+1g (2.18)
where xt;t+i =
Qt+iSft+i
QtSft
and tt;t+i =
Fft+i
Fft
are the growth rates of assets and wealth,
respectively. Hence, the total funding that banks can obtain depends on their wealth:
QtSft =
ht
  vtFft = 
p
tFft (2.19)
with pt being the private leverage ratio. We dene the bankers wealth as follows:
Fft+1 =
 
Rqt+1  Rt+1

pt +Rt+1

Fft (2.20)
Given that the banks total wealth is independent of rm-specic factors, we can
aggregate it to obtain:
QtSt = 
p
tFt (2.21)
Distinguishing between the wealth of the new (F nt ) and the old (F
o
t ) bankers, and
given that the initial funds of the new bankers are dened as the ratio !
1  of the old
bankerswealth (1  )QtSt 1, the total wealth can be stated as:
Ft = F
o
t + F
n
t (2.22)
where
F ot = 

(Rqt  Rt)pt 1 +Rt

Ft 1 (2.23)
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F nt = !QtSt 1 (2.24)
Central bank The central bank implements monetary policy by setting the short-term
nominal interest rate (Rstt ) following a Taylor rule:
Rstt = R

t
e
t

t

  Yt
Y 
y
exp (t) (2.25)
where Rt is the time-varying natural rate of interest estimated by the central bank, 
e
t
is the expected ination rate,  is the steady-state gross ination target, Y  is the natural
level of output consistent with , and ; y are the parameters that measure the central
banks reaction to ination and output deviations from its target levels, respectively. The
monetary policy shock t is an AR(1) process. Moreover, the relationship between real
and nominal interest rates is dened by the Fisher equation Rstt = RtEtt+1.
We also contemplate the possibility that the central bank intermediates a small part
of the total claims (Scbt ) at price Qt carrying e¢ ciency costs  . In order to simplify the
model dynamics, but without ignoring the e¤ects that this kind of intermediation could
generate on the natural rate of interest, we consider that this proportion ( ) is xed and
corresponds to the steady-state value. This lending mechanism is supported by taxes and
by issuing riskless debt acquired by households which is remunerated at the rate Rt, and
yields Rqt . Hence, the structure of the nancial intermediation of the economy is fully
described by the equation:
QtSt = 
p
tFt +  QtSt = 
T
t Ft (2.26)
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with Tt =
1
1  
p
t being the leverage ratio of the economy.
Equilibrium The aggregate equilibrium of the economy is given by:
Yt = Ct + It + f
 
In;kt + I
k
In;kt 1 + Ik
!
(Int + I) +  QtKt+1 (2.27)
Finally, the total output of the economy is equivalent to the intermediate goods rms
output weighted by the inverse of the price dispersion of the retailers (t):
Yt = Y
i
t
 1
t (2.28)
t+1 = 

t+1t + (1  )X t+1 (2.29)
2.3 The natural rate of interest
In this section we introduce the equations that characterize the steady state. Then,
we present the denition of the natural rate of interest that emerges from the model
developed, carrying out a sensitivity analysis in order to evaluate the shifts in this rate
induced by changes in the nancial parameters.
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2.3.1 Steady-state equations
First of all, in order to nd a well-dened endogenous and stable steady state, we have
to normalize the growing variables. We choose the capital stock as the normalization
variable because it is the source of economic growth, whose gross growth rate is dened
as Gt = KtKt 1 . All the normalized variables has the superscript k, whilst the variables
evaluated in the steady state have no subscript. Below we show the main equations
distinguishing among the di¤erent blocks of the model.
From households, intermediate goods producers, capital producers and retail rms,
we can obtain the following expressions:
CkN' = (1  ) X

1  
1   1N
  (2.30)
1
R
=

G
(2.31)
Rq = P iN1  + 1   (2.32)
P i =
X (1  )
 (1   1) (2.33)
X =

1  
1   1
 1
 1
(2.34)
From nancial intermediaries:
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v = (1  )  (Rq  R) + tv (2.35)
h = (1  ) + th (2.36)
p =
h
  v (2.37)
t = (Rq  R)p +R (2.38)
G =
1
1   
pF k (2.39)
F k =  [(Rq  R)p +R]F k + (1  )! (2.40)
And, from the equilibrium of the economy:
N1  (1  )
(1  )X  = C
k +G  (1  ) +  G (2.41)
In order to analyze the consequences of the incorrect estimate of the natural rate of
interest by the central bank, we contemplate the possibility of R 6= R, where R is the
endogenous natural rate of interest. Thus, the Taylor rule in the long run is dened as
follows:
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Rn = R




(2.42)
To derive this expression, we have made use of the equivalence in the steady state
e = . Also, we have assumed Y = Y  but, for reasons given below, we can no longer
assume that  = . We should note that, if R = R, this expression is reduced to
the standard relationship in the steady state between real and nominal interest rate, i.e.
Rn = R.
Substituting the left-hand side of (2.42) by the Fisher equation:
R = R




(2.43)
Hence, the natural rate of interest in the steady state depends on the e¤ective ination
rate, but also on the targets (R;). Rearranging terms:
 = 

R
R
 1

(2.44)
Thus, we have endogeneized the e¤ective ination rate in the steady state, which is
now related to the ination target and the real interest rate deviation weighted by the
parameter of reaction to deviations in the ination rate included in the Taylor rule. This
expression, in logs, coincides with that indicated by Laubach and Williams (2003):
 =  +
1

(r   r) (2.45)
Therefore, the long-run endogenous ination rate and the target rate will match if
68
2.3. The natural rate of interest
and only if the central bank correctly estimates the natural rate of interest. This nding
is in accordance with the conclusion of Tristani (2009). From (2.44) and (2.31), we obtain
the expression:
 = 

G
R
 1

(2.46)
So the e¤ective steady-state ination rate depends on the target of both ination and
the natural rate of interest, as well as on the long-term growth.
If we draw on (2.30) and (2.41), we can solve for G:
G =
1
1 +  

1  
(1  )X N
1    X (1  )	

N '  + (1  )

(2.47)
where  = (1   1) and 	 = (1  ).
Furthermore, from (2.35)-(2.38) we obtain that:
(Rq  R) =  (1  )  v
  v
Rv
(1  ) (2.48)
Now, relying on (2.31), (2.37), (2.39) and (2.40):
G =
(1  )!vR
(1   ) (Rq  R) (  v) 1   R
 v
 (2.49)
Replacing (2.48) in (2.49):
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G =
(1  )2 !
(1   ) [ (1  )  v]
h
1  G


 v
i (2.50)
From (2.31), and (2.32):
(Rq  R) = X	

N1  + (1  ) R (2.51)
Equating (2.48) and (2.51) taking into account (2.31):
N =


X	

1 +
[ (1  )  v] v
(  v)

G

  (1  )
 1
1 
(2.52)
And, introducing the last expression into (2.47):
G =
1
1 +  
(

X	
"
1  
(1  )X   
(1  )X	



	X
 (1+')
1 
#
+ (1  )
)
(2.53)
where  =
h
1 + [(1 ) v]v
(1 )( v)

G

  (1  )
i
.
Summing up, the steady state is determined by (2.50) and (2.53), along with the
expressions of the relative optimal price (2.34) and the e¤ective ination rate in the
steady state (2.46). These equations indicate that the equilibrium is determined by the
e¤ective steady-state ination rate, which, in turn, coincides with its target if the central
bank correctly estimates of the natural rate. However, if R 6= R, the long-term ination
rate is determined not only by its target in the monetary policy rule but also by the error
in the estimation of the natural rate of interest through relationship (2.44). So, if this
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constraint holds, the deviation in the estimation of the natural rate of interest will be
non-neutral in the long run, a key outcome in our analysis. In Section 5, we delve into
this question.
2.3.2 Calibration
The parameter values used in the calibration of the model are reported in Table 1.1
and correspond to the baseline model in Chapter 1. The values of most conventional
parameters are standard in the literature, the policy and nancial parameter values are
taken from Gertler and Karadi (2011), whilst the value of  is set so that the values of
the long-run annual growth rate (2.5%), the annualized external nance premium (1.17%)
and the leverage ratio (4.8) are admissible for an annual ination rate of 2.5%. Using
these values, we nd the solution of equations (2.50) and (2.53) in the plane fv;Gg once
the expressions of X and  are substituted from (2.34) and (2.46).
2.3.3 Denition of the natural rate of interest
According to (2.31), the endogenous natural rate of interest depends on the long-run
growth rate of the economy13, which, in turn, depends on the nancial parameters from
(2.50) and on the e¤ective steady-state ination rate from (2.53). From these three
expressions we can write:
R =
(1  )2 !
(1   ) [ (1  )  v]    G
 v
 = (2.54)
13This result contradicts the nding of Weber, Lemke and Worms (2008), who argue that there is no
a desirable level for the natural rate. Clark and Kozicki (2005) also empirically analyze the link between
this rate and the long-run growth rate and conclude that it is weak.
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=
1
(1  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
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1  
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(1  )X	



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Hence, in this type of models with nancial frictions, the natural rate of interest
depends on the structure of the nancial sector14 as in the denition proposed by De
Fiore and Tristani (2011), even assuming that the central bank correctly estimates it.
Moreover, if the central bank does not match the long-term interest rate estimate with the
endogenous one, this rate will also depend on the monetary policy parameters (; R; )
because the efective long-run ination is a function of these values as has been shown in
(2.46). This nding leads us to maintain that, assuming R 6= R, the deviations a¤ect
the value of the e¤ective natural rate and the steady-state ination rate.
We now explore the relationships among the nancial parameters and the natural rate
of interest assuming R = R since di¤erences among alternative scenarios in terms the
magnitude are mild. The natural rate of interest and the steady-state growth rate are
positively related, so all parameter changes that increase the natural rate of interest also
stimulate the long-term growth rate.
First, we analyze the e¤ects of shifts in the nancial parameters ,, ! and, then, the
e¤ects of variations in the steady-state unconventional monetary policy parameters  , .
Figure 2.1 displays the results for the annualized natural rate of interest. The rst plot
shows how the natural rate drops when the funds that bankers can divert increase. This
means that, when the nancial system prots can be diverted away and not reinvested,
the trend of the depositsyield o¤ered by nancial intermediaries is smaller. Meanwhile,
14In line with this result, previous works such as Borio, Disyatat and Juselius (2013) support the
inclusion of nancial variables in the denition of long-run references such as the potential output.
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the e¤ects of increments in the survival rate of the bankers and in the funds with which the
new bankers start on the natural rate of interest are positive. The lower the rotation of the
intermediaries in the nancial system and the more funds the new nancial intermediaries
own, the higher the risk-free rate of return in the steady state. The most prominent result
is perhaps the e¤ect of a change in , given that it indicates that the renovation of the
intermediaries is not positive for the natural interest rate and, consequently, for the long-
run economic growth.
Figure 2.1: Endogenous natural rate of interest and nancial parameters if  = 2:5%
As regards the unconventional monetary policy parameters, both e¢ ciency costs and
the proportion of the credit policy in the steady state increase the endogenous natural
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rate of interest. The rst parameter weakly a¤ects the natural rate of interest, while the
more funds the central bank intermediates in the steady state, the greater the natural
rate of interest.
2.3.4 Stabilization
As discussed above, some previous work, such as Orphanides and Williams (2002), reveals
that the cost of underestimating the natural rate of interest in terms of economic stabi-
lization is greater than the cost of overestimating it. In order to assess the stabilization
costs of potential estimation errors of the natural rate of interest, we have submitted the
model to the standard types of perturbations, a monetary policy shock and a technologi-
cal shock. We have considered three possible scenarios corresponding to R < R, R = R
and R > R. Under the two kind of shocks, the responses of the variable do not depend
on the accuracy of the estimation of the natural rate15. Therefore, our results do not
support the nding of Orphanides and Williams (2002), because the e¤ects of the errors
are undi¤erentiated, at least for this sort of perturbations. Nevertheless, this does not
mean that these e¤ects are not signicant on the trend, since the values around which
these deviations are obtained change depending on the di¤erent assumptions about the
errors. We delve into this issue in the next section.
2.4 Steady-state e¤ects
In this section we evaluate the impact of errors in the estimation of the natural rate
of interest on the trend of the economy, focusing on the e¤ects on economic growth
15We do not display the plots because the response variable is standard and indistinguishable among
scenarios.
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and examining their impact on the marginal gain of banks and on the gap between the
e¤ective and the targeted ination. To obtain a complete perspective, we will asses the
equilibrium value of our key variables for a wide range of the di¤erential (R  R) and
the ination rate target. We should note that the value of R is endogenously xed by
(2.31), so we modify the value of the interest rate di¤erential by adjusting the interest
rate targeted by the central bank.
Firstly, we analyze the e¤ect of the di¤erential (R  R) on the long-run economic
growth rate. As shown in Figure 2.2, where all variables are expressed in annualized
rates, the behavior depends on . We can distinguish two di¤erentiated types of e¤ects.
The rst for values of  below 1:7% (the rate which provides the maximum steady-state
growth, denoted as op and represented by the black line) and the second for higher
rates. The cause of the existence of this specic threshold is evidenced in Chapter 1,
since  = op = 1:7% is the rate at which the long-run growth rate is maximized in the
absence of estimation errors, as shown in the vertical axis points (when R = R). In the
particular case  = op, the behavior is symmetrical around the maximum for the two
scenarios R < R and R > R.
When the ination rate target is below op, economic growth decreases when R >
R, so the overestimation of the natural interest rate (right-hand side of the graph)
discourages the long-run growth rate. For example, if = 0% andR exceeds the natural
rate by 200 basis points, equilibrium growth decreases more than 0.015 percentage points
with respect to the scenario R = R. This long-term conclusion under the assumption
 = 0 is in line with the short-term nding of Laubach and Williams (2003), who dened
the monetary policy as contractionary when the real rate of interest is above the natural
rate.
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Figure 2.2: Annual growth and interest rate di¤erential
On the other hand, if  > op, the underestimation of the natural rate of interest
has a negative e¤ect on the long-term growth rate. If  = 4%, the growth rate decreases
0.03 percentage points when R is 200 basis points below R.
It is noteworthy that such di¤erences are accentuated the farther away the central
bank is from the optimal ination.
However, we underline that, when the natural rate of interest is underestimated and
 < op or is overestimated and  > op, the conclusions are not univocal. In these
scenarios the relationship between (R  R) and G is hump-shaped. This can be ex-
plained by the fact that, for any ination target, when R 6= R there is an attainable
maximum value for the long-run growth rate, which is almost identical to that maximum
corresponding to the case of R = R and  = op but slightly lower. These maximum
steady-state growth points are located on the left-hand side where R < R for  < op
and on the right-hand side where R > R for  > op. Moreover, the relationship be-
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tween (R  R) and G approximates the scenario R = R the closer the ination target
is to the optimal rate.
Figure 2.3: Marginal gain rate and interest rate di¤erential
Secondly, in Figure 2.3, we explore the relationship between the marginal gain of
the nancial intermediaries from expanding their assets and the interest rate di¤eren-
tial (R  R). As in the previous exercise, the results depend on the ination target
although, in this case, the direction is the opposite due to the negative relationship16
between G and v. When the ination target does not overcome threshold op, the ex-
pected earnings of the nancial system, which depend on the steady-state external nance
premium (R  R), rise if R > R. Contrarily, when  > op, the nancial gain in-
creases if R < R and, for the particular case of  = op, the behavior is symmetric
around the minimum when R = R. Analogously to the case of G, for the scenarios
( < op; R < R) and ( > op; R > R), the relationship has a mixed behavior be-
cause it is U-shaped.
16This relationship is non-linear although, for reasonable levels of trend ination, it is negative.
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Finally, the ination rate di¤erential is studied in Figure 2.4. In this case,  is
xed and set by the monetary authority whilst  is endogenously determined by (2.46).
When R = R, the di¤erential is zero, when R < R, it is positive and, when R > R,
it is negative. Thus, the di¤erentials (  ) and (R  R) have a negative linear
relationship across the whole range, disclosing a very slight di¤erence for any .
Figure 2.4: Ination di¤erential and interest rate di¤erential
The interpretation of these results suggests that, when the ination target is below the
optimal rate, a lax monetary policy that reduces R stimulates the long-run growth rate
because the e¤ective ination rate in the steady state approaches the optimal ination
rate up to a threshold value. By contrast, for high levels of the ination target  > op,
a contractionary monetary policy (R > R) leads to an actual long-term ination closer
to the optimum, again up to a limit, so the growth rate increases. Therefore, if the central
bank wants to stimulate the long-run growth, monetary policy must always reduce the
long-term ination gap jop   j. This can be implemented in two di¤erent ways. The
rst, as we have seen, by modifying the estimate of the natural rate of interest. This
policy will not be useful when R < R and  < op or when R > R and  > op.
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Figure 2.5: Growth and 
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But the objective of increasing the long-run growth rate can also be reached through
the parameter of the Taylor rule that reacts to deviations of ination, . Although
the central bank interprets this parameter as a regulator of the short and medium-term
nominal interest rate, if the estimated natural rate of interest does not match the endoge-
nous one, it will also inuence the long-run growth rate according to (2.46), which is a
prominent result of our work. In order to analyze this relationship, we now again assume
three scenarios, R < R, R = R and R > R, setting the di¤erence between interest
rates (R  R) at 200 basis points above and below zero and changing the value of the
parameter  to observe the e¤ects. As shown in Figure 2.5, the e¤ects of shifts in 
depend on both the ination target and the di¤erential (R  R). If R < R, an increase
in  triggers a reduction of the long-run growth rate if and only if the ination target is
below 1%. However, if the ination target is greater than 1%, the relationship is positive.
If, instead, the central bank sets a long-run interest rate equal to the endogenous value,
there are no di¤erences in the growth rate for any variation of  regardless of the value
of . But, if R > R, the long-run growth rate decreases with  for ination targets
higher than 3% and increases with lower ones.
This section contains a wealthy set of conclusions about the many di¤erent situations
that could be happening in the long run. The necessary information to know where an
economy is situated will be crucial for reaching the objectives of the monetary policy. In
the following section we use these results in order to identify where is the economy in a
given point of time.
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2.5 Verication
Although the exact knowledge of the natural rate of interest in real time is a challenging
task, some of the conclusions drawn from our previous analysis could assist the monetary
authorities in this objective. With the exercise we propose in this section, the central
bank would be able to nd out both its monetary policy stance regarding the ination
rate that maximizes long-run growth and the accuracy of the estimate of the natural rate
of interest. In this way, monetary authorities could monitor the performance of monetary
policy in relation to long-term growth.
To clarify the iterative mechanism we have designed, in Figure 2.6 we propose a
stylized outline of Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.6: Verication process. The long run
Let us suppose that the central bank is located at an unknown point of Figure 2.6 in
which the only known long-run variables are the targets included in the monetary policy
rule (; R). There are two possible strategies; the rst is the aim of maximizing the
long-term growth rate and the second widens this goal by including the correct estimate
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of the natural rate of interest. Below, we describe the steps required to achieve both
goals. We study the changes in the steady state that would generate the modication of
some policy tools and, then, we provide some guidelines for interpreting the transition
path in the short term.
Maximizing G
The success of the rst strategy is very straightforward to achieve. The central bank
only has to move the estimate of the natural rate of interest until the long-run growth
rate stops increasing. Assuming17 that  6= op, there are six possible types of initial
points (A, B, C, D, E, F), marked on Figure 2.6, and two optimal nal points depending
on whether  < op or  > op. The direction of the correct shifts of R depends on
the position of the initial point with respect to the global maximum located at a specic
value of (R  R), which di¤ers for each of the displayed ination targets. As the central
bank does not possess this information, the rst movement tests the proper adjustment
of R and the subsequent changes iteratively modify R up to the maximum long-run
growth rate in the direction indicated by the arrows. To illustrate this method, let us
assume that the initial point is ( = 0%;R = 4:5%). The aim of the central bank is
to maximize G, but it does not know either op or R. Keeping  constant, the rst
random move of the policymaker might be to increase R, but this would bring down G.
Hence, the central bank has ascertained that it has to reduce R in order to increase G,
though it still does not know if the starting point was C, D or E. This process will make
G reach its maximum at the point ( = 0%;R = 3%).
This exercise would be simple if G were known. Unfortunately, monetary authorities
17Otherwise the procedure would be the same.
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do not know the long-term growth rate exactly, but they perform estimates based on
provisional information. Therefore, we now relax the assumption of the correct knowing18
of G and we suppose that the central bank can only perceive the direction of changes in
Gt, that is, the short-run growth rate. Although some authors such as Orphanides and
Van Norden (2002) have criticized the condence of real-time calculations, we consider
that this assumption is not unreasonable.
Above, we have computed the steady-state values of the endogenous variables for
the di¤erent levels of (R  R), so the exercise now builds on the evaluation of the
transition path between scenarios in the absence of other shocks. In order to do this, we
propose a simulation in which a permanent change in the estimate of the natural rate of
interest is imposed. Thus, our model loses its stochastic quality, which is explained by
the anticipated nature of this kind of alteration of the model.
As in the previous example, we suppose that the initial target is  = 0%, the case of
the blue line in Figure 2.6. Figure 2.7a displays the response of Gt across 20 quarters to
a change in R. As expected, when the central bank reduces the intercept in the Taylor
rule from 4:5% to 3:5%, the short-term growth rate increases. Conversely, if the central
bank raises the natural rate estimate from 3:5% to 4:5%, the growth rate diminishes after
some periods. However, this consequence is valid if and only if the estimate of the natural
rate is above the rate that ensures the maximum long-run growth rate (points19 C, D
and E in Figure 2.6), which corresponds to R = 3% when  = 0%. If, for instance,
the central bank raises the estimate from R = 1:5% to R = 2:5% (point F), Gt does
18Much academic literature has empirically addressed related issues with di¤erent perspectives, such
as the estimation of the potential output and its trend, as in Edge et al. (2007). There are some earlier
works, such as Kuttner (1994), that suppose this rate is constant, but later works suppose a time-varying
rate as in Laubach and Williams (2003), who jointly estimate the natural rate of interest and the trend
growth rate.
19We include point C because the central bank does not know op.
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not decrease but, as can be seen in the solid line in Figure 2.7a, increases. Analogously,
a change from R = 2:5% to R = 1:5% causes a drop in Gt.
Figure 2.7: Verication process. The short run I
% Deviation from the steady state
The conclusions are the same if the target ination rate exceeds the optimal rate.
Figure 2.7b shows the transition path of the short-term growth rate between steady
states if  = 3%. As in the previous simulation, Gt increases when the central bank
approximates to the estimate of the natural rate that maximizes G (in this case R = 9%)
and decreases otherwise.
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Therefore, even if both the optimal ination rate and the natural rate of interest were
unknown, central banks would have a tool that allows them to maximize the long-term
growth rate through the modication of the intercept in the Taylor rule.
Maximizing G and reaching R = R
The second strategy, which includes the reaching of the maximum long-term growth and
the correct estimate of R, requires a multiple-step process. Firstly, the policymaker has
to move  to assess the sign of the di¤erential (R
  R). Figure 2.8a plots the responses
of the short-term growth rate to a decrease in  from  = 2:05 to  = 1:6 for several
combinations of  and R. Figure 2.5 showed that the shifts in the long-run growth rate
from a modication in  depend on both (R
  R) and (   op). However, in the
short-term horizon, Gt rises when  decreases if and only if R
 < R whatever the value
of  and vice versa. Given that R approaches 6:5% for both levels of  considered,
the state R < R is represented in Figure 2.8a by the solid lines and R > R by dashed
lines20. The justication is based on that, as long as  penalizes deviations in t from
, its reduction means a more expansive policy which enhances the short-term growth
rate if and only if the intercept set in the Taylor rule does not constrain the monetary
policy or, equivalently, if R < R. Thus, if Gt rises when  increases, the central bank
can discard, following Figure 2.6, points B, C and D. At this point, the central bank has
the information derived from the rst step of this mechanism about the sign of (R  R).
Once this information is known, policymakers have to move R until arriving to the
R = R scenario, that is, when Gt does not change when  varies. In our example,
where  = 0%, this happens when R = R = 6:5%.
20For the sake of clarity, we have shown only these cases, although the behavior described holds for
all other scenarios.
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Figure 2.8: Verication process. The short run II
% Deviation from the steady state
If the central bank additionally wants to maximize G, shifts in  will reveal the sign
of (   op). As shown in Figure 2.8b, and supposing that the starting ination target
is 1%, if the central bank lowers  to zero and Gt decreases, this means that  < op,
so the achieving of the double goal involves the increase of  until Gt stops growing,
that is, when  = 1:7%.
Hence, policymakers have all the information required to approach the desirable long-
run equilibrium. The possibilities shown in this exercise can, therefore, provide the central
banks with enough information to achieve their goals and to adjust the precision of its
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estimate of the natural rate of interest.
2.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we have analyzed, from a monetary policy point of view, the role of the
natural rate of interest in a New Keynesian model with endogenous growth, nancial
frictions and trend ination. First, we have introduced the DSGE model and we have
delved into the steady state obtaining a denition of the natural interest rate. We have
shown that this rate depends on the nancial structure and have carried out a sensitivity
analysis to determine the nature of this dependence. Furthermore, if the central bank
does not use the correct natural rate of interest in the monetary policy rule, the long-term
ination rate does not match the target. As a result, the natural rate of interest becomes
dependent on the monetary policy in two ways, since it is sensitive to its own estimate
error and to the ination target.
As regards the short-term economic stabilization, we have analyzed a monetary and a
technology shock and have found that the errors in the natural rate used in the monetary
policy rule do not a¤ect for the responses of the variables and that there is no asymmetry
between under- and over-estimation.
Moreover, we have determined the relationship between the potential errors in the
estimation of the natural rate and the long-run growth rate. We have proved that this
relationship depends on the ination target because, if it is below (above) the optimal
long-run ination rate, long-term growth decreases when the estimation of the natural
rate is above (below) the endogenous one. The opposite happens with the relationship
between the marginal gain for expanding the assets of the banks and the error in the
87
Chapter 2. Natural Rate of Interest, Monetary Policy and Growth with Trend Ination
and Financial Frictions
estimation. However, in the other possible scenarios, the relationship is hump-shaped,
so the conclusions are not univocal. Furthermore, the parameter included in the Taylor
rule that reacts to deviations of ination in the short term will also generate shifts in the
long-run growth if the natural rate estimate is not the endogenous one. Therefore, we
can conclude that, according to these results, the errors in the estimation of the natural
rate of interest are not neutral in the long run.
Finally, on the basis of our results, we have developed a mechanism to verify the
stance of the monetary policy with respect to the optimal ination from the growth
perspective and the accuracy of the natural rate estimation, which can lead to maximizing
the long-run growth. The central bank has to nd out the sign of the di¤erential between
the estimated and the endogenous natural rate of interest as well as the position of
the ination target with respect to the rate that maximize the long-run growth. The
monetary authority rst makes use of the parameter that reacts to ination deviations
in the monetary policy rule. Then, by modifying the intercept of the Taylor rule and
the ination target, the central bank will be able to determine the position of both the
ination target with respect to the optimal rate and the estimated natural rate of interest
with respect to the endogenous one.
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Non-linear E¤ects of the U.S.
Monetary Policy in the Long Run
3.1 Introduction
The existence of rigidities and frictions in the markets leads to non-neutral monetary
policies in the long run and non-linear e¤ects of some key variables according to New
Keynesian dynamic models with endogenous growth (Chapters 1 and 2). These two
features are especially clear when monetary policy is conducted following some type of
ination targeting using the short-term interest rate as the instrument or, in other words,
following a Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993). In this chapter, we search for these nonlinearities
for the case of the U.S. monetary policy. In particular, we are interested in three non-
linear e¤ects of the monetary policy in the long run: the non-linear relationships between
the trend ination and the growth rate, between the trend ination and the external
nance premium and between the growth rate and the error in the estimation of the
natural rate of interest. But the possibility of nding this type of evidence is hindered
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by the problem of the non-observable character of the long-term variables.
In fact, the relevance of the long-term variables is crucial for the performance of the
monetary policy carried out by central banks. All specications of Taylor rules include
one or more long-term variables, whose unobservability is an intrinsic characteristic. The
long-term variables which are usually incorporated into the monetary policy rules are the
natural interest rate, the ination target and the potential output21. As a result of the
importance of these variables for the policy design, many contributions have been made
on their estimation. Nevertheless, this task is not straightforward.
There are several approaches to estimating unobservable variables. The simplest tech-
niques are the univariate lters such as that of Hodrick-Prescott, but these methods are
only based on the statistical properties of the series and ignore the connections with other
variables. Equilibrium models can also be built in order to estimate unobserved series
as is done in, among others, Neiss and Nelson (2003), Smets and Wouters (2003), Gi-
ammaroli and Valla (2004) and Andrés, López-Salido and Nelson (2009), but the resulting
estimates are based on subjective assumptions and are prone to be more volatile (Edge
et al., 2008). As an alternative to the foregoing methods, and admitting that this rou-
tine has been the object of some criticism22, our approach is based on the Kalman lter
applied to a semi-structural econometric model. This procedure has been implemented
by many studies to estimate long-term values of several economic variables. However,
most of the papers that follow this technique do not jointly estimate all the long-term
variables involved in the monetary policy rules23 nor emphasize the long-term perspec-
tive. By contrast, our approach simultaneously includes the natural rate of interest, the
21We consider these variables as long-term variables instead of medium-term references.
22As discussed in Weber, Lemke and Worms (2008).
23An exception is Bjørnland, Leitemo and Maih (2011), but they combine Bayesian and Kalman lter
procedures. Benati and Vitale (2007) also obtain estimates of all the variables, but their purposes are
far from ours as we focus on the long-term perspective.
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long-run growth rate and the steady-state ination in the estimation process in order to
capture all the long-run interactions we are interested in.
The rst long-run variable we estimate is the natural rate of interest dened as the
long-run real rate of interest that ensures ination stability and the reaching of the po-
tential output. The estimation of this variable has attracted the interest of the literature
since central banks conduct monetary policy through rules with this rate as the inter-
cept. Moreover, the gap between the natural rate of interest and the actual real rate is
very useful because it measures the monetary policy stance and has predictive power for
future ination. Many empirical studies have tried to assign a value to this rate, which
initially was considered constant over time. Afterwards, in a seminal paper, Laubach and
Williams (2003) drop the assumption of a xed value24 and estimate the time-varying
natural rate of interest (TVNRI) for the U.S. by applying the Kalman lter. The papers
that have followed this methodology are not few. Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2004), Méson-
nier and Renne (2007) and Garnier and Wilhelmsen (2009) estimate the TVNRI for the
euro zone, Larsen and McKeown (2003) for the U.K., Manrique and Marques (2004) for
the U.S. and Germany, Basdevant et al. (2004) for New Zealand, Brzoza-Brzezina (2006)
for Poland and, recently, Bouis, et al. (2013) for Canada, the euro zone, Japan, Sweden,
Switzerland, the U.K. and the U.S. Combining Bayesian methods with the Kalman lter,
Edge, Kiley and Laforte (2008) and Bjørnland, Leitemo and Maih (2011) estimate the
TVNRI for the U.S. 25.
We also focus on the implications generated by the potential error that central banks
could commit in the estimation of the natural rate of interest. This issue has been
24They argue that this rate changes in response to shifts in preferences and in the trend growth rate
of output. Trehan and Wu (2007) compare the implications of considering the natural rate of interest to
be xed or variable.
25Other methods have been applied in Christensen (2002), Vitek (2005) and Horváth (2009).
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theoretically studied in Chapter 2 and in other works such as Orphanides and Van Norden
(2002), Orphanides and Williams (2002) and Tristani (2009). We approximate the gap
between the correct and the estimated TVNRI and compute its e¤ects on long-term
ination dynamics.
Estimating the TVNRI requires the estimation of the long-run trend of the potential
output because, in the theoretical dimension, both variables are closely related. In ad-
dition, this estimation is necessary because monetary policy rules are specied in terms
of output deviations from the steady state level. Therefore, potential output and, conse-
quently, its growth rate, is the second unobservable variable we estimate.
But the TVNRI and the potential output are not the only variables involved in the long
run that are relevant for monetary policy. Trend ination is another long-term variable
that plays an important role in its design and in its outcomes26. Like the potential
output, it serves as a reference in the deviation measure of the ination rate as long
as it coincides with the ination target of the monetary policy rule. Moreover, as it is
pointed out in Chapter 2, the potential incorrect estimation of the TVNRI generates a
gap between the ination target and its steady-state value that sets o¤ distortions in
the long-run equilibrium. Therefore, by including this variable in the estimation process,
an increase in the robustness of the analysis is expected as well as an expansion of the
range of conclusions. In this line, Leigh (2008) estimates the TVNRI for the U.S. through
the Kalman lter, but all other unknown variables are overlooked. Moreover, a relevant
topic we want to study is the relationship between the long-run growth rate and the
trend ination. Previous theoretical literature mentioned in Chapter 1, such as Amano
et al. (2009), shows the existence of a non-linear relationship between these two long-
26In this regard, Ascari (2004) and Cogley and Sbordone (2008), among others, analyze the e¤ects of
non-zero trend ination on short-term dynamics.
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term variables. And, despite the fact that the Kalman lter provides a linear estimation,
we use the outcomes of the model to check the kind of connection between them through
a quadratic and a quantile regression.
Another issue we want to discuss is the role of nancial frictions in the determination
of the main long-term variables. Chapter 1 shows a connection between nancial frictions,
the growth rate and the trend ination in the long run with some non-linear relationships.
Ö¼günç and Batmaz (2011) follow the Laubach and Williams (2003) procedure and include
the risk premia for Turkey. They conclude that the long-run evolution of this spread
determines the natural rate of interest. This link between nancial frictions and the
TVNRI is also studied empirically in Archibald and Hunter (2001) for the New Zealand
case.
Our database comprises time series for the U.S. during the period 1960:Q1-2013:Q2.
The evolution of the estimates of the TVNRI, the long-run growth rate of the economy
and the steady-state ination rate are in line with foregoing results. Our estimates prove
the negative e¤ect that nancial frictions would cause on the long-run growth rate, that
potential misunderstandings of the TVNRI would deviate the trend ination from the
ination target and that the relationship between the long-run growth rate and the trend
ination is described as a nearly hump-shaped curve.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The second section describes the
methodology applied. In the third section, we present the estimation results, carry out
a quadratic and a quantile analysis of the relationships among the long-run growth rate,
the trend ination and nancial frictions, and study the e¤ects of misunderstandings of
the natural rate of interest. Finally, Section 4 summarizes the main conclusions. The
Kalman lter procedure is detailed in Appendix B1 and the state-space form of the model
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is explained in Appendix B2.
3.2 Estimation methodology for the unobservable vari-
ables
To achieve the objectives stated in the previous section about the estimation of the long-
run unobservable variables, we extend the Laubach and Williams (2003) semi-structural
model by making some modications. The core of the procedure, a state-space model
devoted to implementing the Kalman lter, remains unchanged. However, we include a
new state variable, the trend ination. This extension complicates the model but adds
robustness to the whole estimation since it jointly estimates all relevant variables in the
long-term horizon. We also introduce some changes into the model specication in order
to improve the consistency of the long-run implications and to check some theoretical
outcomes.
This empirical model is a small-scale simplication of the New Keynesian macroeco-
nomic model developed in Chapters 1 and 2, where the main ndings we want to evaluate
are the relationships among the long-run economic growth rate, the trend ination and
nancial frictions, as well as other relevant conclusions like the e¤ects of potential errors
in the estimation of the natural rate of interest. The connections established among these
variables show the non-linear e¤ects of the monetary policy in the long run.
The rst equation of the model corresponds to the Phillips curve and describes the
evolution of the ination rate (t), an observable value. We dene the ination rate as the
core consumer price index, which includes all items except food and energy, and take the
data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The quarterly series is obtained as the monthly
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average value and then is seasonally adjusted with the Tramo/Seats methodology. Once
we have computed the quarterly ination rate, the data is annualized. We consider the
ination rate as a function of its own lags, the output gap (zt), the trend ination (t)
and a serially uncorrelated error term "t . In this way, we ensure the consistency of the
model in the long term because ination rate would equal its steady-state value, the trend
ination. The resulting equation is the following:
t+1 = 
(L)t + 
zzt + (1  (L))t + "t+1 (3.1)
where (L) is a lag-polynomial and z is interpreted as the slope of the Phillips
curve.
The next relationship is a state equation equivalent to the reduced form of the IS curve
that explains the output gap, the percentage deviation of the real output from its potential
level. This variable depends on its own lags and on the measurement error of the natural
rate of interest, dened as the di¤erence between the ex-ante real interest rate (Rt) and
the natural rate of interest (Rnt ). In turn, real interest rate is gauged by subtracting the
ination expectations (Ett+1) from the short-term nominal interest rate Rstt , which is
obtained from the Federal Reserve System database. Ination expectations are computed
by an 8-quarters forward-moving average and nominal interest rate is equivalent to the
federal funds e¤ective rate. Again, a serially uncorrelated error term "zt is included. This
relationship is also consistent with the long run because, in the absence of shocks and
mismeasurement problems, the output gap would be zero in the steady state:
zt+1 = 
z(L)zt + 
r (Rt  Rnt ) + "zt+1 (3.2)
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where z(L) is a lag-polynomial. We assume, following Mésonnier and Renne (2007), a
denition of the natural interest rate based on standard optimal growth models. However,
the specication is slightly di¤erent and follows Bouis et al. (2013), where the natural
rate of interest is related to the long-run growth rate (gt) corrected by a parameter27 @ and
augmented by , the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption,
also interpreted as the relative risk aversion. An intercept % is also included, which
represents the time preference of consumers:
Rt = %+  (gt   @) (3.3)
The long-run growth rate, equivalent to the growth of the potential output yt , is
explained as a function of its rst lag, nancial frictions (ft) and the trend ination.
Financial frictions are proxied by the spread between the average majority prime rate
charged by banks on short-term loans to business and the 3-month Treasury bill rate,
both series collected from the Federal Reserve System database. This external nance
premium is a standard simple measure of the frictions present in the nancial markets.
An intercept and a serially uncorrelated error term are also included. In the steady state,
the growth rate would depend on a xed value @ and also on the trend ination, as is
theoretically shown in Chapter 1:
gt = @ (1  g) + ggt 1 + ft + {t 1 + "gt (3.4)
As can be seen, one main di¤erence between our specication and those of Laubach
and Williams (2003) and Mésonnier and Renne (2007) is that growth of the potential
27In terms of the Ramsey model, parameter @ could be interpreted as a measure of the e¤ects of the
average productivity and population growth rates.
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output is dened as a function of state and observed variables instead of a simple AR(1)
process. Moreover, our hypothesis regarding the order of integration of both Rnt and gt
follows the approach of Mésonnier and Renne (2007) assuming highly persistent but sta-
tionary variables driven by unobservable processes which capture common low-frequency
variations in Rnt and gt as well as idiosincratic uctuations of gt.
Trend ination is determined by its rst lag and the ination expectations. As noted
in equation (3.1), trend ination would equal the ination rate in the long run:
t+1 = 
t +
 
1  Ett+1 + "t+1 (3.5)
Finally, the last equation is the identity that denes the output gap as the di¤erence
between the output (yt), built as the log of the real chain-weighted GDP in billions of
chained 2009 dollars taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, and the log of its
potential level:
zt = yt   yt (3.6)
Summing up, the unobservable variables that we jointly estimate are (yt ; gt; R
n
t ;t),
whilst the observed variables are (t; Rstt ; yt; ft). We should note that shocks
 
"t ; "
z
t ; "
g
t ; "

t

are independently and normally distributed and their variances are
 
2; 
2
z; 
2
g; 
2


, re-
spectively.
Having introduced the equations of the semi-structural model, we have to articulate
the state-space model. Appendix A1 is devoted to presenting the state-space representa-
tion which consists of the measurement equation and the transition equation. Afterwards,
we are able to implement the Kalman algorithm (Kalman, 1960). The basic intuition be-
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hind this procedure follows two steps. In the rst, the system makes a prediction based on
the information available at a specic point of time. In the next period, the lter corrects
this prediction by uploading the new information. The maximum likelihood method is
used to estimate the conditionally unbiased and e¢ cient estimators of the state variables.
In Appendix A2, we formally detail the Kalman lter mechanism28.
3.3 Results for the U.S. economy
We now estimate the model specied in the previous section. The quarterly data set
we have used refers to the United States in 1960:Q1-2013:Q2. It should be noted that
the Kalman lter is very sensitive to the initial conditions. The technique we have
implemented to overcome this issue consists of several steps. Firstly, we carry out a
univariate estimation of each unobserved variable. To that end, we have applied the
Hodrick-Prescott lter to the ination rate, the real GDP and its growth rate in order to
obtain preliminary estimates of the trend ination, the potential output and the long-run
growth rate, respectively. Secondly, we have estimated each equation including the series
provided by the HP lter with the purpose of assigning the initial values to the parame-
ters. This rst estimation of the Kalman lter generates variances biased towards zero29
and, therefore, unsatisfactory results outside the acceptable values for the unobservable
variables. Thus, we have to use the common method of restricting some coe¢ cients by
calibrating the following parameters:
 Following Bouis et al. (2013), one of the best candidates to gauge % is the average
of the actual real interest rate because it measures the trend value of the natural
28Good references to understand this procedure are Harvey (1989) and Hamilton (1994).
29Because of the pile-up problem described in Stock (1994).
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rate of interest approximately. This approach is also used to set the value of the
intercept of the long-run growth rate equation @, equating it to the sample average
of the real output growth rates.
 Due to the lack of consensus about the value of the parameter , we choose the
value 4.167, used in our theoretical model of reference developed in Chapter 1.
 Finally, we calibrate 2 so that trend ination accounts for 50% of the ination
rate uctuations.
Table 3.1: Coe¢ cient estimates
1 0.814 (12.72)
z 0.158 (2.43)
z1 0.901 (14.06)
r -0.179 (-4.33)
g 0.813 (8.20)
 -0.020 (-1.69)
{ 0.009 (1.69)
 0.883 (13.55)
2 1.746 (12.84)
2z 0.3456 (8.72)
2g 0.033 (7.70)
LF -633.2
z-Statistic in parenthesis. LF: Likelihood function.
We now explore the results of the model by analyzing the estimated coe¢ cients shown
in Table 3.1. As can be seen, all the coe¢ cients have the expected sign and are statistically
signicant. Regarding the lags included for the ination rate in (3.1), we impose order 1
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for the (L) lag-polynomial, whose coe¢ cient is 1 . Otherwise, the coe¢ cient associated
with t in (3.1) loses weight and, consequently, the state estimates become distorted. The
signicativity criterion reveals that the lag-polynomial of the output gap in (3.2) is of
order 1. Both the slope of the Phillips curve z and the coe¢ cient r, which drives the
output gap in accordance with uctuations in the di¤erence between the actual interest
rate and its natural level, are higher than those estimated by Laubach and Williams
(2003) and Bouis et al. (2013)30, but remain within reasonable values. Financial frictions
negatively a¤ect the long-run growth rate, which can be seen from the negative value
of . Trend ination exerts the opposite e¤ect because coe¢ cient { has a positive sign,
though the size is very low. As the statistical signicance of these two linear e¤ects is
at the limit of 10%, we go deeper into this issue in the last part of this section when we
pose the question of the non-linear e¤ects.
The estimation of the model with the features described above yields the evolution
of the unobserved variables displayed in Figure 3.1. We should clarify that these series
are two-sided estimates or smoothed estimates, that is, to compute them, the Kalman
algorithm has used the information of the full sample. In addition, we have discarded the
rst few quarters because the estimates are outside the admissible range.
Table 3.2 displays the statistical properties of the unobserved variables. Output gap
shows an expected path in the range (-6%,5%) with eight slowdowns corresponding to
the o¢ cial recession dates of the U.S. economy31, which also can be appreciated in the
long-run growth rate trajectory. This rst inference seems to verify the accuracy of the
estimates.
30Other values of the literature are summarized in Mésonnier and Renne (2007).
31The crisis periods are 1960:Q2-1961:Q1, 1969:Q4-1970:Q4, 1973:Q4-1975:Q1, 1980:Q3, 1981:Q3-1982-
Q4, 1990:Q3-1991:Q1, 2001:Q1-2001:Q4 and 2007:Q4-2009:Q2.
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Figure 3.1: Estimates of the unobserved variables
Grey bars refer to the o¢ cial recession dates provided by the National Bureau of Economic Research.
Dashed lines represents the 90% condence interval.
The sharpest declines of the output gap are situated at the beginning of the sample
and in the early 1980s recession, whilst the long-run growth rate reaches its minimum
value in 2008 during the nancial crisis. The trajectory of the natural rate of interest is
obviously analogous to the long-run growth rate evolution because the former is dened as
a linear combination of the latter. Values of the long-run growth rate and the natural rate
of interest in 2008:Q4 seem to be atypical since the troughs of both series are anomalously
low for long-term references. Finally, the trend ination rises sharply from the late sixties
to 1980, during the Pre-Volcker era. After reaching its peak in the middle of Volckers
presidency of the Federal Reserve System, the trend ination has constantly decreased
leading to the so-called Volcker disination. From the late-nineties, under the leadership
of Greenspan, the trend ination has stabilized around a value of approximately 2%, level
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at which it is assumed that FED locates its ination rate target for the medium and long
term.
Table 3.2: Statistical properties of the estimated series
Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Output Gap -0.70 1.95 -6.32 4.40
(1962:Q1) (1978:Q4)
Growth Rate 2.91 1.21 -1.38 5.57
(2008:Q4) (1984:Q1)
Natural Rate of Interest 1.38 1.24 -3.06 4.07
(2008:Q4) (1984:Q1)
Trend Ination 4.45 2.08 1.30 9.09
(2012:Q2) (1983:Q1)
3.3.1 Searching for nonlinearities
We have seen, in Table 3.1, that the estimation of the coe¢ cient { is near zero and that
its corresponding p-value is slightly lower than 10%, so the linear relationship between
the long-run growth rate and the trend ination is very weak. The same remark can
be made about the relationship between the external nance premium and the growth
rate. These are not two counterintuitive results in the light of the ndings of Chapter
1, because these outcomes may not mean the absence of a relationship between the
trend ination and the long-run growth rate and between the latter and the external
nance premium, but perhaps the model specication used is veiling relevant bivariate
movements. The theoretical results we have proposed to test in this chapter are the
presence of nonlinearities between these two pairs of variables but, unfortunately, in the
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model to which the Kalman lter is applied, non-linear specications can not be included.
Although the Extended Kalman lter can integrate such specications, its operation is
very complex, so we have opted for a two-step analysis. The rst, already done, is to
obtain estimates of the state variables. In the second, we use these estimates of the
unobservable long-run variables to test the hypothesis established in Chapter 1, a hump-
shaped relationship between the long-run growth rate and the trend ination, on the one
hand, and a U-shaped relationship between the trend ination and the external nance
premium, on the other.
A simple way to look for non-linear relationships is to dene a quadratic equation.
By doing so, the result obtained for the regression is the folowing:
g^t = 0:52 + 0:98^t   0:08^2t + u^gt
(1.42) (5.88) (-4.84)
(3.7)
where ^t and g^t are the trend ination and the long-run growth rate series estimated by
the Kalman lter, u^gt refers to the residuals and the t-ratios are presented in parentheses.
In line with the foregoing theoretical results, the coe¢ cient values show a hump-shaped
relationship between g^t and ^t plotted in Figure 3.2. This very signicant non-linear
relationship indicates that, for low levels of trend ination, the long-run growth rate
increases until ^t = 6% and, after this value, the growth rate decreases with the trend
ination, reaching zero when it is 12.7% and -0.5%. The annualized maximum potential
growth is near 4%. But this outcome varies depending on the sample considered. If
we contemplate a period of ination stability, such as the subsample beginning in 1994
during which the Federal Reserve has reacted preemptively against deviations of ination
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from its target, the level of trend ination for which estimated growth is maximized drops
markedly to ^t = 4%.
Figure 3.2: Quadratic relationship between g^t and ^t
As in our previous exercise, we again perform this analysis to test for the link between
nancial frictions and the trend ination in the long run. Chapter 1 conclude that this
connection has a U shape. Equation (3.8) presents the estimated coe¢ cients, where it
can be seen that the U-shaped relationship found in that chapter, displayed in Figure
3.3, is corroborated. It should be noted that the level of trend ination for which esti-
mated growth is maximized nearly matches the minimum value of nancial frictions, as
is concluded in Chapter 1.
ft = 4:90   1:11^t + 0:11^2t + u^ft
(16.04) (-7.96) (7.69)
(3.8)
where u^ft are the residuals.
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Figure 3.3: Quadratic relationship between ft and ^t
Another way of searching for the nonlinearties we are interested in is to take into
account that the state estimates have been obtained using a specic linear model. Hence,
maintaining this specication we analyze the relationship of both the trend ination and
nancial frictions with the long-term growth rate, looking for possible nonlinearities.
In doing so, we again try to verify if the theoretical results obtained in Chapter 1 are
validated. We take the sample 1962:Q1-2013:Q2 in order to avoid the initial distorted
observations of the state estimates. The methodology we adopt is based on a quantile
regression but, in contrast to the common practice of ordering observations according to
the endogenous variable, we arrange the quantiles according to an exogenous variable,
the trend ination. Thus, the specication of our equation of interest, which relates the
long-term growth rate, nancial frictions and the trend ination, is the same32 as (3.4),
although levels of the explanatory variable ^t are distinguished. We opt for six quantiles
because this is the largest number that provides an acceptable number of observations
in each quantile. Table 3.3 shows the lower and the upper limit of each quantile, the
estimated coe¢ cients, the variance and the coe¢ cient of determination.
We expect a positive sign of { in the lower quantiles and a negative one in the higher,
32We no longer include the trend ination as a lag because that was a specic constraint of the Kalman
lter.
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what would resemble the inverted parabola obtained previously. For all the quantiles
except the last one and, consequently, for most of the sample, the relationship can be
described as an inverted U curve. However, when trend ination is above 6.67% (last
quantile), which occurs between 1973 and 1984, the estimated coe¢ cient is positive. Nev-
ertheless, this scenario could be considered as an anomalous pattern since, during those
years, the two economic recoveries after strong downturns were attached to a monetary
policy that did not react severely to ination deviations.
Table 3.3: Quantile regression
Quantiles
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th
Minimum ^t 1.30% 2.09% 3.42% 4.35% 5.22% 6.67%
Maximum ^t 2.06% 3.40% 4.31% 5.21% 6.52% 9.09%
@ (1  g) 0.324 -0.262 0.085 0.227 0.263 -0.454
(1.68) (-2.77) (0.26) (1.10) (1.74) (-2.22)
g 0.973 0.804 1.054 0.947 0.905 0.921
(25.77) (14.91) (9.86) (10.34) (20.83) (15.06)
 -0.161 0.026 0.006 -0.024 -0.014 -0.046
(-4.02) (2.60) (0.70) (-1.11) (-1.27) (-3.31)
{ 0.120 0.118 -0.035 -0.026 -0.031 0.085
(2.23) (2.82) (-0.56) (-0.52) (-1.21) (3.21)
2 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.009
R2 0.96 0.97 0.92 0.88 0.94 0.90
t-ratios are reported in parentheses.
With respect to the relationship between nancial frictions and the long-run growth
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rate, coe¢ cient  is statistically signicant at 5% only for the extreme lower and higher
values of the trend ination, so the inuence is coherent with the U-shaped relationship
between the trend ination and the external nance premium. For medium ination rate
levels, when the external nance premium does not reach the upper levels and, therefore,
credit markets operate exibly, their uctuations do not a¤ect, or positively a¤ect, the
long-term growth rate. However, when the degree of nancial frictions increases, long-run
growth could be negatively a¤ected by such rigidities.
3.3.2 Long-run e¤ects of natural rate of interest mismeasure-
ments
In order to capture other non-neutral and non-linear e¤ects of the monetary policy in the
long run, we approximate the real-time gap between the estimated and the correct value
of the natural rate of interest as the di¤erence between the one-sided (R^t , ltered) and
the two-sided (R^nt , smoothing) estimates following Mésonnier and Renne (2007). This is
a proxy of the mismeasurement gap since the former estimation takes into account the
information available at the time of the estimation, as central banks do, and the latter
uses the full sample information of the signal variables, which approaches the true value.
In Figure 3.4, the evolution of the mismeasurement gap is displayed.
This gap reaches a substantial size and, even if we do not consider the highest de-
viations, the gap moves around values of ( 0:5%; 1%). When the mismeasurement gap
takes positive values, monetary policy tends to be more contractionary since the intercept
of the rule is higher than the endogenous value. Analogously, when the gap is negative,
monetary policy is more expansive. The average of the gap is near 0.25% meaning that,
on average, Federal Reserve implements a restrictive monetary policy through the over-
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estimation of the natural rate of interest.
Figure 3.4: Gap (R^t   R^nt )
Plot of the 2-quarter central moving average of the gap between
the ltered (R^t ) and the smoothing (R^
n
t ) estimation of the TVNRI
We now explore the potential implications of the existence of this gap from the long-
run perspective. This exercise is based on the theoretical work developed in Chapter
2, where it is concluded that central banksmisunderstandings in the estimation of the
natural rate of interest a¤ect the long-run equilibrium by deviating the steady-state
ination rate from its target. When the natural rate of interest estimated by the central
bank is higher than the correct value, trend ination is below its target and vice versa.
Accordingly, the relationship between the deviation of the natural rate and the gap of
the trend ination is negative.
Firstly, in order to carry out this analysis, we have to transform the trend ination
series to be comparable with the mismeasurement gap. Hence, we have to calculate
the deviations of the trend ination from the estimated target, the latter proxied by
its statistical mean. However, the evolution of the estimated trend ination exhibits a
clear non-linear pattern of behavior. To verify this point, we have estimated the mean
of this variable by way of the Bai-Perron methodology, which allows for the presence
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of structural changes (see Bai and Perron, 1998, 2003) throughout the sample 1962:Q1-
2013:Q2. The application of this methodology leads us to observe the existence of 5
di¤erentiated periods in the evolution of the trend ination with the following break
points: 1970:Q3, 1979:Q2, 1986:Q4 and 1995:Q2. The estimated annualized values for
the mean of the trend ination in the ve subperiods are 4.1%, 6.1%, 7.5%, 4.9% and 2.3%,
respectively. Secondly, with these averages, we can compute the deviations of the trend
ination from the estimated target and relate them to the mismeasurement gap. In order
to smooth both series, characterized by strong uctuations, we construct the 2-quarter
central moving averages for the trend ination and the mismeasurement gap. Figure 3.5
shows the scatter plot of the trend ination deviations

^t   ^t

, where ^t is the trend
ination estimate and ^t is the target, and the mismeasurement gap

R^t   R^nt

, where
R^t is the estimated intercept of the Taylor rule and R^
n
t is the estimated natural rate of
interest:
Figure 3.5: Trend ination deviations from its target and mismeasurement gap
Scatter plot between the 2-quarter central moving average of (^t ^t ) and (R^t R^t).
t-ratios in parentheses
This analysis reveals that the relationship is negative for the full sample as the theo-
retical analysis predicts. However, if we divide the total sample into the specied periods
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detailed above, the results are not homogeneous. In the nal period, which is the largest
one of the time intervals considered, the negative relationship is much clearer than in the
whole sample. These results lead us to think that, when monetary policy was conducted
through monetary aggregates and the implicit or explicit estimation of the natural rate
of interest was not required, or monetary authorities do not react against ination devia-
tions tightly enough, the mismeasurement gap was not so relevant and was not so clearly
transferred to the long-term ination. So, we can conclude that, with policies derived
from Taylor rules whose priority is the ination stability, the natural rate of interest and
its measurement become essential for the monetary policy because measurement errors
could inuence the long-term equilibrium. These preliminary results seem to support this
intuition and, therefore, verify the negative relationship between the two gaps specially
for the period in which the Federal Reserve conducts monetary policy through ination
targeting rules which react severely and preemptively against ination deviations.
3.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, we analyze the long-run interactions of the U.S. unobservable variables
included in the Taylor rules. Firstly, we look for the existence of nonlinearities between
the long-run growth rate, the trend ination and nancial frictions in the long run.
Through quadratic equations, we conrm the existence of a hump-shaped connection
between the long-run growth rate and the trend ination and a U-shaped relationship
between the latter and nancial frictions. Then, by estimating a quantile regression
which distinguishes among levels of trend ination, we corroborate that hump-shaped
connection if the trend ination does not exceeds an upper threshold. Moreover, especially
for low and high levels of trend ination, nancial frictions negatively a¤ect the long-run
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growth rate.
Furthermore, we approximate the gap between the real-time estimate and the correct
value of the natural rate of interest and study its e¤ects on the trend ination deviations
from the target level. We prove that, for the whole sample, there is a negative relationship
between the error in the estimation of the natural rate of interest and the gap of the
actual trend ination and its target, as is concluded in the theoretical models developed
in Chapters 1 and 2. This negative relationship is especially clear and signicant when
monetary policy reacts aggressively against ination deviations. In turn, deviations of the
trend ination from its target could also a¤ect nancial frictions and the long-run growth
rate, since have been demonstrated the interactions among these three key variables.
In order to obtain all these results, we have jointly estimated the natural rate of inter-
est, the potential output and the trend ination using U.S. data for the 1960:Q1-2013:Q2
period. Our procedure extends the methodology of Laubach and Williams (2003), who
implement the Kalman lter to a semi-structural econometric model in order to obtain
the unobservable series, by including the trend ination as a state variable and nancial
frictions as an exogenous factor. The state estimates show that the long-run growth
rate and the natural rate of interest have experienced an unprecedented decline during
the nancial crisis triggered in 2007, a pattern that is not observed for the output gap.
Meanwhile, the trend ination has stabilized since the mid-nineties around a value of 2%.
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In the foregoing chapters, we have delved into the transmission mechanism of monetary
policy in the long run. Although the idea of the neutrality of monetary policy in the long
run has been widely accepted by most economic doctrines, this property is being revised
recently given the current policy rules and the existence of rigidities and frictions in
some markets. With the aim of studying this issue, we have abandoned some unrealistic
assumptions concerning the Taylor rule that New Keynesian models usually introduce.
Furthermore, there are reasons for thinking that rigidities in nancial markets could
a¤ect the long-term behavior, so we have included a nancial sector with frictions in
our baseline model. To conclude, we have evaluated the main outcomes obtained in the
theoretical developments for the United States.
Although central banks set positive ination targets, most macroeconomic models are
built around the assumption of null ination in the steady state for reasons of analytical
convenience. Therefore, in the rst chapter, we have removed the assumption of zero
ination in the steady state. We have proved that the conclusions drawn in the New
Keynesian models are sensitive to the elimination of this assumption. In addition, we
have incorporated frictions in the nancial markets through an agency problem between
nancial intermediaries and their depositors. As we have seen, the combination of these
two elements causes several changes in the results of the model when economic growth is
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introduced.
Firstly, we have found nonlinearities between the long-run growth rate and the nan-
cial parameters given the value of the trend ination, which is set by the central bank
in the monetary policy rule. It should be noted that the dependence of the long-run
growth rate and the trend ination remains as long as price frictions persist, the equilib-
rium remaining dependent on the nancial structure unless the rigidities in this market
disappear. We have found a hump-shaped relationship between the long-run growth rate
and the trend ination, which implies the existence of an optimal level of trend ination
that maximizes the long-run growth rate, welfare, investment and nancial wealth. The
reasons behind this behavior are closely linked to the nancial sector. For the optimal
level of trend ination, the external nance premium reaches its minimum value as well
as the yield of nancial intermediariesclaims and the marginal gain from expanding the
assets. Moreover, when the nancial structure changes, there is a trade-o¤ in the long-run
between the growth rate and the marginal gain of nancial intermediaries.
With regard to the short-term dynamics, the triggering of a monetary shock shows that
trend ination also a¤ects the stabilization of the economy after a transitory perturbation,
since the higher the trend ination, the greater the response of the real variables, such
as the growth rate and investment, or the nancial elements such as the external nance
premium. Nevertheless, this behavior is not appreciated in the case of a productivity
disturbance such as a technological shock.
To conclude the rst chapter, we have simulated a crisis in order to evaluate the
reaction of our baseline model under several intensities of credit policy. The crisis consists
of a decline in capital quality, which causes an increase in the external nance premium,
whilst the credit policy is implemented through direct lending to non-nancial rms. The
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impulse-response exercise reveals that this kind of unconventional monetary policy a¤ects
both real and nancial variables by mitigating the reaction in the initial periods after the
crisis, but prolongs the impact on most variables to the long term. This nding, along
with the relevance of the unconventional monetary policy parameters for the long-term
equilibrium, conrms the caution that central banks should take when implementing such
measures.
The second chapter extends our benchmark model by, again, eliminating a critical
assumption. In this case, we no longer assume that the natural rate of interest, included
in the Taylor rule as the intercept, is correctly estimated by central banks. In an initial
step, we have obtained a denition of the natural rate of interest, which depends on the
nancial sector for any hypothesis regarding the accuracy of its estimation. Furthermore,
we have determined that, if the central bank mismeasures the natural rate of interest,
this rate becomes dependent on its own estimate and on the ination rate target.
Although the short-term reactions to transitory perturbations do not change with
errors in the estimation of the natural rate of interest, long-run references do. The
relationship between the error and the long-run growth rate depends on the ination
target. If the target surpasses the optimal ination rate, identied in Chapter 1, and
the estimate of the natural rate of interest is under the endogenous value, the long-run
growth rate declines when this estimate drops. However, if the ination target is under
the optimal value, the relationship is hump-shaped. The relation between the error and
the marginal gain of the nancial intermediaries is the opposite whilst the deviations of
the long-term ination rate from its target are always negatively related to the errors
for any target. Furthermore, we have studied the interactions between the parameter
included in the Taylor rule that reacts to ination deviations from its target and the
long-run growth rate in the presence of estimation errors.
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Conclusions
We have developed a guideline for testing the accuracy of the estimation of the natural
rate of interest and the position of the ination target with respect to the optimal rate.
We have taken our previous outcomes as our basis and have evaluated the transition
dynamics between steady states in order to assess the short-term paths and, in this way,
to determine the stance of the monetary policy. It has been shown that, by using the
estimate of the natural rate of interest, the ination target and the parameter that reacts
against ination deviations, it is possible to maximize the long-run growth rate and to
correctly estimate the natural rate of interest after a sequence of changes.
In the last chapter of the dissertation, we empirically evaluate the ndings obtained in
the previous work for the United States for the sample 1960:Q1-2013:Q2. With the aim
of searching for potential nonlinearities between the long-run growth rate and the trend
ination, we estimate a quadratic equation to describe the relationship between these two
variables and nd that this relation is hump-shaped, as the theoretical results predict.
Nevertheless, through a quantile regression which divides the sample among the levels
of trend ination, we nd that the estimates of the coe¤cients, except for the highest
level of trend ination, support the hump-shaped relationship but, for some quantiles,
the relation is not statistically signicant.
Then, we have estimated the mismeasurement error of the natural rate of interest.
We relate this gap to the deviations of the trend ination from its target, as is outlined in
Chapter 2, and nd that, since monetary policy reacts severely against ination deviations
in the United States, trend ination surpasses its target if the central bank overestimates
this rate, and vice versa.
In order to perform this analysis, we have solved the problem of the unobservability
of the long-run variables. With this purpose, we have jointly estimated all the long-term
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references included in the Taylor rule, namely, the natural rate of interest, the potential
output and the trend ination. We apply the Kalman lter to a stylized representation
of our benchmark model in order to obtain the unobservable series and, thereby, are able
to study the long-term connections. The estimated series of the long-run growth rate and
the natural rate of interest su¤er their maximum decline during the nancial crisis, but
the highest output gap decrease occurs at the beginning of the sample. It is interesting
to note that, from the mid-nineties, the trend ination has stabilized around 2%.
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A lo largo de los tres capítulos de esta tesis hemos profundizado en el mecanismo de
transmisión de la política monetaria en el largo plazo. Aunque la idea de neutralidad
de la política monetaria ha sido ampliamente aceptada por la mayoría de las doctrinas
económicas, esta propiedad se está revisando recientemente a la luz de las reglas de
política monetaria actuales y de la existencia de rigideces y de fricciones en determinados
mercados. Con el propósito de profundizar en esta cuestión, se han abandonado algunos
de los supuestos poco realistas que se plantean en los modelos neokeynesianos respecto
a la regla de Taylor. Además, como existen argumentos que señalan a que las rigideces
de los mercados nancieros pueden afectar al equilibrio de largo plazo, hemos incluido
en nuestro modelo de referencia un sector nanciero con fricciones. Para concluir, hemos
evaluado los principales resultados teóricos obtenidos para el caso de Estados Unidos.
Aunque los bancos centrales jan un objetivo de inación positivo, los modelos macro-
económicos se construyen habitualmente en base a la hipótesis de que la inación es nula
en el estado estacionario por razones de conveniencia analítica. En el primer capítulo
hemos eliminado este supuesto y hemos probado que las conclusiones especicadas en
los modelos neokeynesianos son sensibles a su supresión. Además, hemos incorporado
fricciones en los mercados nancieros a través de un problema de agencia entre inter-
mediarios nancieros y depositantes. Hemos comprobado que la combinación de ambos
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elementos origina cambios relevantes en los resultados del modelo si se introduce crec-
imiento económico endógeno.
En primer lugar, se detectan no linealidades entre la tasa de crecimiento de largo plazo
y los parámetros nancieros, dado el valor de la inación de estado estacionario que ja
el banco central en la regla de política monetaria. Además, se observa que la relación
entre la tasa de crecimiento de largo plazo y la inación de estado estacionario prevalece
siempre y cuando las rigideces de los precios persistan, resultando el equilibrio dependiente
de la estructura nanciera salvo que las rigideces en estos mercados desaparezcan. Se
demuestra que dicha relación tiene forma de U invertida. Por lo tanto, hay un nivel óptimo
de inación de estado estacionario para el cual se maximizan la tasa de crecimiento, el
bienestar, la inversión y la riqueza nanciera en el largo plazo. Las razones que se
hallan detrás de este comportamiento se deben buscar en el sector nanciero. Para
dicho nivel óptimo de inación de estado estacionario, la prima de nanciación externa
alcanza su valor mínimo y, por tanto, también alcanzan su suelo el rendimiento de los
activos de los intermediarios nancieros y la ganancia marginal derivada de expandirlos.
Asimismo, cuando la estructura nanciera cambia, se produce un intercambio entre la
tasa de crecimiento y la ganancia marginal de los intermediarios en el largo plazo.
El el corto plazo la simulación de un shock en la regla de política monetaria mues-
tra que la inación de equilibrio estacionario también afecta a la estabilización de la
economía tras una perturbación transitoria dado que, cuanto más alta es, mayor es la
respuesta de las variables. Sin embargo, este comportamiento no se aprecia para el caso
de una perturbación en las variables reales, como es el caso de un shock exógeno en la
productividad.
Para concluir el primer capítulo se ha simulado una crisis con el n de evaluar la
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dinámica del modelo ante distintas intensidades de política crediticia. La crisis consiste
en un descenso de la calidad del capital, que provoca un aumento de la prima de nan-
ciación externa, siendo la política crediticia no convencional implementada a través de
préstamos directos a las empresas productoras de bienes intermedios. El estudio de las
funciones impulso-respuesta revela que este tipo de política monetaria no convencional
afecta tanto a las variables reales como a las nancieras mitigando su reacción en los
periodos iniciales posteriores a la crisis, pero prolonga el impacto sobre la mayoría de las
variables reales y nancieras, cuya respuesta llega a alcanzar el largo plazo. Esta con-
clusión, junto con la relevancia de los parámetros de la política monetaria no convencional
en el equilibrio de largo plazo, ratica la precaución que deben tener los bancos centrales
cuando implementan este tipo de medidas.
El segundo capítulo extiende el modelo excluyendo, de nuevo, un supuesto crítico. En
este caso, ya no se asume que la tasa natural de interés incluida en la regla de Taylor
como constante está bien estimada por parte del banco central. Se establece la denición
de tasa natural de interés, que depende del sector nanciero para cualquier hipótesis
respecto a la precisión de la estimación. Asimismo, se determina que, si el banco central
estima incorrectamente la tasa natural de interés, esta tasa queda en función de su propia
estimación y del objetivo de inación.
Respecto a la dinámica de corto plazo, los efectos de los shocks coyunturales no se ven
afectados por los errores de estimación del tipo de interés natural, pero sí las variables de
largo plazo. La relación entre el error de estimación y la tasa de crecimiento de largo plazo
depende del objetivo de inación. Si la tasa objetivo supera la tasa óptima, identicada en
el Capítulo 1, y la estimación de la tasa natural de interés es menor que el valor correcto,
la tasa de crecimiento de largo plazo desciende cuando dicha estimación se revisa a la
baja. Sin embargo, si el objetivo de inación es inferior a la tasa óptima la relación tiene
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forma de U invertida. Por su parte, la relación entre el error de estimación y la ganancia
marginal de largo plazo de los intermediarios nancieros es la contraria, mientras que
las desviaciones de la tasa de inación de equilibrio estacionario respecto a su objetivo
siempre están relacionadas negativamente con los errores de estimación cualquiera que
sea el objetivo. Además, se han estudiado las interacciones que se establecen entre el
parámetro de respuesta a las desviaciones de la inación incluido en la regla de Taylor y
la tasa de crecimiento de largo plazo en presencia de errores de estimación.
Se ha desarrollado nalmente una guía para vericar la adecuación de la estimación
de la tasa natural de interés y la posición de la inación objetivo respecto a la tasa
óptima. En base a las conclusiones previas se han evaluado las dinámicas de transición
entre estados estacionarios para calcular las trayectorias de corto plazo y, de esta manera,
determinar la posición de la política monetaria. A través del uso de la estimación de la tasa
natural de interés, del objetivo de inación y del parámetro de respuesta a las desviaciones
de la inación es posible maximizar la tasa de crecimiento de largo plazo e igualar la
estimación de la tasa natural de interés a su valor endógeno mediante aproximaciones
sucesivas.
En el último capítulo se evalúan empíricamente los resultados teóricos para el caso
de Estados Unidos durante el periodo 1960:Q1-2013:Q2. Con el objetivo de localizar las
posibles no linealidades existentes entre la tasa de crecimiento de largo plazo y la tasa
de inación de estado estacionario, estimamos una ecuación cuadrática para describir
la conexión entre ambas variables y encontramos que dicha relación tiene forma de U
invertida, tal y como los resultados teóricos establecían. No obstante, mediante una
regresión cuantílica que divide la muestra entre niveles de inación de estado estacionario,
se observa que las estimaciones de los coecientes, exceptuando el cuantil que representa
los niveles de inación de estado estacionario más elevados, apoyan dicha relación aunque,
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para algunos cuantiles, la signicatividad estadística es muy baja.
A continuación, se ha estimado el error de estimación de la tasa natural de interés.
Poniendo esta brecha en relación a las desviaciones de la inación de estado estacionario
respecto de su objetivo se encuentra que, desde que en Estados Unidos la política mone-
taria se lleva a cabo mediante reglas que jan el tipo de interés nominal y que reaccionan
agresivamente contra la inación, si el banco central sobreestima la tasa natural, la in-
ación de equilibrio estacionario supera su objetivo y viceversa.
Para poder realizar estos análisis, se ha tenido que solventar el problema de la inob-
servabilidad de las variables de largo plazo incluidas en la regla de Taylor, es decir, la
tasa natural de interés, la producción potencial y la tasa de inación de equilibrio esta-
cionario. Aplicando el ltro de Kalman a una representación estilizada de nuestro modelo
teórico, se han estudiado las conexiones de largo plazo. La serie estimada de la tasa de
crecimiento de largo plazo y de la tasa natural de interés sufren su máxima disminución
durante la crisis nanciera, pero el output gap protagoniza el mayor descenso al principio
de la muestra. Es interesante señalar que, desde mediados de los noventa, la inación de
equilibrio estacionario se ha estabilizado en torno a un valor anualizado del 2 %.
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Appendix for the First Chapter
A.1 Normalized model
W kt = C
k
t N
'
t (A1.1)
Ett;t+1Rt = 1 (A1.2)
t;t+1 = 
Ckt
Ckt+1Gt+1
(A1.3)
W kt = (1  )P it
Y i;kt
Nt
(A1.4)
Et

Rqt+1
	
=
P it+1
Y i;kt+1
et+1
+Qt+1   
Qt
et+1 (A1.5)
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Y i;kt = e
at
 
et

N1 t (A1.6)
In;kt = I
k
t    (A1.7)
Gt+1 = 1 + I
n;k
t (A1.8)
Qt = 1 + f +
In;kt + I
k
In;kt 1 + Ik
f 0   Ett;t+1
 
In;kt+1 + I
k
In;kt + I
k
!2
f 0 (A1.9)
Y kt = C
k
t + I
k
t + f
 
In;kt + I
k
In;kt 1 + Ik
!
In;kt + I
k

+  tQtGt+1 (A1.10)
Y kt t = Y
i;k
t (A1.11)
vt = Et

(1  ) t;t+1
 
Rqt+1  Rt+1

+ t;t+1xt;t+1vt+1
	
(A1.12)
ht = Et f(1  ) + t;t+1tt;t+1ht+1g (A1.13)
pt =
ht
  vt (A1.14)
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tt;t+1 =
 
Rqt+1  Rt+1

pt +Rt+1 (A1.15)
xt;t+1 =
pt+1
pt
tt;t+1 (A1.16)
QtGt+1 = 
T
t F
k
t (A1.17)
Tt =
1
1   t
pt (A1.18)
 t = v

Et
 
Rqt+1  Rt+1
  (Rq  R) (A1.19)
F kt = F
o;k
t + F
n;k
t (A1.20)
F o;kt = 

(Rqt  Rt)pt 1 +Rt

F kt 1 (A1.21)
F n;kt = (1  )!Qtet (A1.22)
Xt = 
Et
P1
i=0 
it;t+i
Qi
k=1t+k

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k
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Et
P1
i=0 
it;t+i
Qi
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 1
Y kt+i
(A1.23)
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Xt =

1  
1   1t
 1
 1
(A1.24)
t+1 = 

t+1t + (1  )X t+1 (A1.25)
Rstt = R

t

  Y kt
Y kt
y
et (A1.26)
Rstt = RtEtt+1 (A1.27)
A.2 Steady-state equations
wk = CkN' (A2.1)
R = 1 (A2.2)
 =

G
(A2.3)
wk = (1  )P iY
i;k
N
(A2.4)
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Rq =
P iY i;k +Q  
Q
(A2.5)
Y i;k = N1  (A2.6)
Q = 1 (A2.7)
G = (1  ) + Ik (A2.8)
Y k = Ck + Ik +  QG (A2.9)
Y k = Y i;k (A2.10)
v = (1  )  (Rq  R) + xv (A2.11)
h = (1  ) + th (A2.12)
p =
h
  v (A2.13)
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t = (Rq  R)p +R (A2.14)
x = t (A2.15)
QG = TF k (A2.16)
F k = F o;k + F n;k (A2.17)
F o;k =  [(Rq  R)p +R]F k (A2.18)
F n;k = (1  )!Q (A2.19)
X = P i
1   1
1   (A2.20)
X =

1  
1   1
 1
 1
(A2.21)
 =
(1  )X 
1   (A2.22)
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Rst = R (A2.23)
T =
1
1   
p (A2.24)
 =  (A2.25)
These are the normalized equations evaluated in the steady state. We must now dene
the reduced system in order to nd the endogenous equilibrium. If we equalize (A2.1)
and (A2.4) and we additionally use (A2.6), (A2.8), (A2.9), (A2.20) and (A2.21), we can
solve for G:
G =
1
1 +  

N1 

  X (1  )	

N '  + (1  )

(A2.26)
where  = (1   1) ;	 = (1  ). Furthermore, from (A2.11)-(A2.15) we
obtain that:
(Rq  R) =  (1  )  v
  v
Gv
 (1  ) (A2.27)
Now, from (A2.2), (A2.3), (A2.7), (A2.13), and (A2.16)-(A2.19):
1 =
(1  )!v
(1   ) (Rq  R) (  v)
h
1  G


 v
i (A2.28)
Replacing (A2.27) in (A2.28):
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)2 !
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)  v]
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1  G
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i (A2.29)
From (A2.2), (A2.3), (A2.5), (A2.6), (A2.7) and (A2.20):
(Rq  R) = X	

N1  + (1  )  G

(A2.30)
Equating (A2.27) and (A2.30):
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Introducing the last expression in (A2.26):
G =
1
1 +  
(

X	
"
1

  (1  )X	



	X
 (1+')
1 
#
+ (1  )
)
(A2.32)
where  =
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) v]v
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)( v)

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i
A.3 Log-linearized model
The accented variables refer to the logarithmic deviation with respect to its steady state
value.
~wkt = ~c
k
t + '~nt (A3.1)
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A.3. Log-linearized model
~t;t+1 + ~rt = 0 (A3.2)
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A.3. Log-linearized model
~F kt =
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Appendix for the Third Chapter
B.1 State-space form of the model
To implement the Kalman lter procedure, equations (3.1-3.6) have to be expressed in the
state-space form. This appendix describes the state-space model respecting the notation
in the main text.
The measurement equation describes how the observations are derived from the in-
ternal state vectors:
264yt
t
375 =
2641  1 0 0 1
0  0 1  1 0
375
26666666666664
zt
zt 1
t
t 1
gt
37777777777775
+
264 0
1
375t 1 +
264 0
"t
375 (B1.1)
where 1 is the rst element of the 
(L) lag-polynomial. The representation of the
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state equation indicates that the new state vector is modeled as a linear combination of
the previous state and an error process:
26666666666664
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zt 1
t
t 1
gt
37777777777775
=
26666666666664
z1  r 0
1 0 0
0 0 
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0  0
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3777775+
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0
@ (1  g)
37777777777775
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0
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(B1.2)
B.2 The Kalman lter
The Kalman lter is a semi-structural method to estimate unobserved variables. It is
a suitable procedure because it provides a Minimum Mean Squared Error estimator if
the observed variables and the noises are jointly Gaussian. To show the operation of the
lter, let us dene ot as an n  1 vector, where ot is an observable variable. This time
series is a function of an m 1 vector, ut, whose value and variance are unobservable. In
order to simulate the latent variable, we have to specify a model as follows:
ot = 1;t + 2;tut + "
o
t (B2.1)
ut+1 = 3;t + 4;tut + "
u
t (B2.2)
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where i;t are vectors and "ot ; "
u
t are vectors of Gaussian noises. The rst equation
(B2.1) is the measurement or observation equation whilst equation (B2.2) is the state or
transition equation. Disturbance errors "ot ; "
u
t are serially independent, with the following
variance structure:

t = var

"ot
"ut

=
264Ht Jt
J 0t Bt
375 (B2.3)
where Ht is an n n symmetric variance matrix, Bt is an mm symmetric variance
matrix, and Jt is an nm matrix of covariances.
The smoothing procedure generates the estimates of the state variables u^t  ET (ut)
with variance V ut varT (ut) and estimates of the signal variables o^t  E (ot j u^t) =
1;t + 2;tu^t. The one-step ahead prediction error is "
o
t = "
o
tjt 1  ot   otjt 1 and the
prediction error variance is V ot = V
o
tjt 1 var

"otjt 1

= 2;tP
o
tjt 1
0
2;t +Ht, where P
o
tjt 1 is
the mean square error of the one-step ahead mean.
The Kalman lter updates the one-step ahead estimate of the state mean and variance
with new information and computes the one-step ahead estimates of the state and the
associated mean square error matrix, the contemporaneous or ltered state mean and
variance and the one-step ahead prediction, prediction error and prediction error variance.
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Glossary of Variables and
Parameters
Table C.1: Glossary of variables
Ct Consumption
Nt Labor supply
Dt Real one-period life deposits and nominally riskless discount bonds
Rt Real gross interest rate
 t Real rms prots and payouts
Wt Real wage
Tt Lump sum taxes
t;T Discount rate
Y it Intermediate output
Kt Capital stock
t Capital quality shock
at Aggregate productivity shock
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Table C:1: Glossary of variables (cont.)
St Financial claims
Qt Capital price
Rqt Capital return
P it Relative price of intermediate goods
Int Net investment
It Gross investment
Yt Final output
Pt Price index of the nal output
P t Price set by those rms which change it
D Steady-state gross ination rate
t Real gross interest rate
Xt Relative optimal price
Ft Net wealth of nancial intermediaries
Vt Expected wealth of nancial intermediaries
vt Marginal gain of the banks from expanding their assets
ht Expected value of having an additional unit of net wealth
xt;T Growth rate of assets
tt;T Growth rate of wealth
pt Private leverage ratio
F nt Financial wealth of the new bankers
F ot Financial wealth of the old bankers
Rstt Short-term nominal interest rate
t Monetary policy shock
Scbt Loans issued by the central banks
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Table C.1: Glossary of variables (cont)
Spt Financial claims intermediated by nancial intermediaries
Dcbt Riskless debt issued by the central bank
 Proportion of claims intermediated by the central bank
Tt Leverage ratio of total intermediated funds
t Price dispersion
Gt Gross growth rate of capital
Gyt Gross growth rate of output
 Steady-state ination rate target
R Steady-state interest rate target
op Optimal ination rate
zt Output gap
"t Serially uncorrelated error term
Rnt Time varying natural rate of interest
ft Financial frictions
u^gt Residuals quadratic function 3.7
u^ft Residuals quadratic function 3.8
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Appendix C. Glossary of Variables and Parameters
Table C.2: Glossary of parameters
 Proportion of householdsmembers who are bankers
 Discount term
 Relative utility weight of labor
' Elasticity of labor supply
 Participation of capital
z Technology shock persistence
 Capital quality shock persistence
 Capital depreciation rate
& Investment adjustment costs
 Elasticity of substitution
 Probability of keeping prices xed
 Survival rate of the bankers
 Fraction of bank assets that can be diverted
! Wealth proportion of the new bankers
 Coe¢ cient of ination in the Taylor rule
y Coe¢ cient of output gap in the Taylor rule
 Monetary shock persistence
 Central Bank e¢ ciency costs
 Steady state value of credit policy
 Retailers Markup
 Auxiliary parameter
 Auxiliary parameter
	 Auxiliary parameter
1 1 Coe¢ cients of log-linear Phillips curve
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Table C.2: Glossary of parameters (cont.)
b Intensity of credit policy
 Autoregressive parameter of ination
z Slope of the Phillips curve
z Autoregressive parameter of output gap
r Interest rate error coe¢ cient
% Intercept in natural rate of interest equation
@ Degree the productivity and population growth rates
g Autoregressive parameter of output growth
 Coe¢ cient of nancial frictions
{ Coe¢ cient of trend ination
 Autoregressive parameter of trend ination
2: Variances
Table C.3: Glossary of superscripts and subscripts
Superscripts t Time
j Intermediate goods rms
s Retailers
f Financial intermediaries
Subscripts k Normalized variable
 Target
Variables without subscript t are the steady-state values.
Lower case variables are the log of the original variable.
Accented lower case variables are the log-deviations of the
original variables from their steady-state levels.
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